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PREFACE
This report describes a study performed for NASA Ames Research
Center on methods for predicting the cost, reliability, and maintaina-
bility of advanced avionics systems designed for use by general avia-
tion in the 1980s and beyond. The study is one of a number of NASA-
sponsored research efforts encompassed by the Advanced General Avia-
tion Avionics System (AGAAS) program. The purpose of the Rand study
is to provide NASA with information about avionics cost, reliability,
and maintainability (CRM) that will be helpful in formulating the
succeeding phases of the AGAAS program and in evaluating alternative
technical approaches proposed by participating contractors. Practical
problems of predicting the CRM of advanced avionics systems for gen-
eral aviation are examined in detail. The usefulness and shortcomings
of the different modeling approaches for cost and reliability estima-
tion are discussed, together with the special problems caused by lack
of historical data on the cost of maintaining general aviation avion-
ics. Suggestions are offered on how NASA might proceed in assessing
CRM implications of advanced avionics in the absence of reliable gen-
eralized predictive models.
This study draws heavily on results of earlier, government-
sponsored research in the area of cost and reliability predictions and
maintenance requirements. Air Force and airline experience is
presented wherever it is deemed relevant to advanced general aviation
avionics.
Views or conclusions expressed herein are the authors' and do not
necessarily represent the opinion of NASA. This Working Note is
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intended to transmit research results to the sponsor, and may not be
distributed without the sponsor's approval.
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SUMMARY
General aviation forms a large and important segment of the total
U.S. civil aviation activity. It accounts for the vast majority of
aircraft operations, includes more than 95 percent of the total U.S.
civil aviation fleet, and contributes a substantial fraction of the
passenger miles flown each year. General aviation has played an
important role in the economic growth in the U.S., and it has the
potential to play an even greater role in the future.
There is, however, significant uncertainty about the future of
general aviation in the U.S. because of the unknown impact of the
increasingly complex and costly equipment that the Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) requires in order to operate in the National Airspace
System. Some effects are evident already: operating procedures are
complicated, regulations are becoming more and more restrictive and
comprehensive, and the requirements for new and/or better avionics
equipment are drastically increasing the cost of owning an airplane.
A related effect is the increasing demand on pilot training and profi-
ciency necessary to operate the additional equipment efficiently and
safely.
To address these problems, NASA recently initiated a program of
Advanced General Aviation Avionics Systems (AGAAS). The objective is
to provide the critical information required for the design of a reli-
able, low-cost, advanced avionics system (AAS) which would enhance the
safety and utility of this mode of transportation.
The objective of the present study is to provide NASA with a
methodology for estimating cost, reliability, and maintenance require-
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ments (CRM) for advanced general aviation avionics equipment operating
in the 1980s. In the course of the study, all known research done by
others in CRM prediction methodologies for avionics and related equip-
ment was reviewed, and visits were made to four major manufacturers of
general aviation avionics equipment and to a number of Air Force agen-
cies to learn how they handle the problem of CRM prediction.
Our analysis of past attempts at creating generalized parametric
models for predicting cost and reliability revealed that these efforts
have produced limited and not very useful results. The utility of the
models is inherently limited to prediction within a specific technol-
ogy, and they are unsuccessful in prediction where the technologies
have changed from those used to formulate data for the original
models. All avionics equipment is in a period of rapid technological
evolution, so that parametric models based on experience with current
equipment are seldom useful in predicting cost and reliability charac-
teristics of future equipment. Furthermore, electronic equipment is
peculiar in that a desired function can be produced by a wide variety
of electronic means, each of which has its own circuitry and associ-
ated parts. Devices with similar, if not identical, performance capa-
bility can have very different internal components, and therefore very
different manufacturing costs, maintenance problems, and reliability.
Avionics for general aviation poses a special problem in that
little or no systematic data are collected on the actual reliability
or support cost of the equipment. Therefore, it was not possible to
develop any parametric models, however limited, in response to the
basic objective of the present study. However, the research produced
a substantial amount of information relevant to the design of future
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avionics for general aviation, and that information is summarized in
this Working Note.
Our survey of manufacturers of avionics and related equipment
revealed that they do perform cost, reliability and maintainability
(CRM) analysis, but generalized parametric models are not considered
to be trustworthy and are therefore not used. Although most manufac-
turers hold the details of their CRM prediction methodologies as
proprietary, the general approach is engineering based, and not
parametric. This engineering approach requires a preliminary design
sufficiently detailed to allow identification of specific parts and
fabrication methods for use in cost prediction and
reliability/maintainability assessment. Most reliability assessment
programs are a company version of MIL Handbook 217B, modified to
include company experience and methods. The use of such methods will
allow the cost data for one system to be compared with the cost data
of other systems. The ability to perform sensitivity analysis, how-
ever, will be limited or nonexistent.
In the absence of generalized, parametric assessment techniques,
NASA should require that each submission of a candidate design be
accompanied by a contractor's prepared estimate of users' purchase
price, maintenance philosophy, and maintenance cost estimates. These
estimates should be backed up by a description of the cost-estimating
methodology used, and a listing of analogous and corroborative data.
The description should be complete enough that the estimates can be
duplicated and evaluated. Estimates prepared in this way will most
likely be engineering estimates that rely on piece parts count, piece
parts prices, and manufacturing labor cost estimates.
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The inputs to these cost estimates can be reviewed for their rea-
sonableness and completeness, or in the case of technologies that are
not yet commercialized, for evidence that the estimate made is defen-
sible. Estimates made in this manner can be used to make comparisons
among the various designs that are submitted, provided that it is
understood that the estimating methods used for different levels of
design will probably have widely differing (and unknown) estimating
accuracy. Therefore, comparisons that are made should stress general
cost ranges rather than exact differences between estimates, and
should concentrate where possible on uncertainties in the estimates.
The closely related characteristics of reliability and maintaina-
bility pose a particularly troublesome issue in the evaluation of AAS
designs. General aviation equipment is now supported and maintained
by a wide variety of organizations, many of them relatively small.
Yet the AAS designs seem likely to involve a highly integrated system
of digital components, posing a very sophisticated maintenance prob-
lem. The Air Force and airline experience with advanced avionics
equipment shows fault diagnosis and isolation to be the number one
maintenance problem. The design of tests (i.e., diagnostic program
development) for detection and location of faults in highly integrated
systems is often frustrated by great difficulties in predicting
failure modes. For this reason it is essential to emphasize reliable
means of fault isolation early in the design stages. To ensure that
maintainability is considered early in the design, a requirement must
be placed on the designer to prepare a maintenance philosophy and plan
as part of the preliminary design. An evaluation of the philosophy
and plan should be conducted at each design review to ascertain if
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they will work, given the technical capabilities of existing mainte-
nance personnel and the organizational structure through which mainte-
nance is most likely to be performed.
It appears that introduction of AAS-like equipment will require
some major changes in the organization of the support and maintenance
system for general aviation avionics, as well as in the design of the
equipment. Thus it is unlikely that parametric models based on past
experience will be suitable for reliability prediction of the new
equipment. Moreover, the estimation of absolute reliability in prac-
tical terms for new equipments, using new parts and untested designs,
is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the prospects for a more limited
assessment of reliability—the comparison of two (or more) candidate
designs for their inherent relative reliability—are quite favorable,
given only a few easily understood standard procedures. First, use of
the standard MIL Handbook 217B methodology gives assurance that many
of the factors known to affect reliability are being assessed equally
between or among candidates. The use of a newly available digital
computer program for this purpose increases the assurance of complete-
ness and lack of bias (both essential to producing the best of what
may still be uncertain predictions), and at the same time reduces the
effort and expense required to provide this vital comparative measure.
The specific procedures consist of:
1. Listing the individual electronic parts of the system,
which means that a detail design must exist.
2. Associating all relevant parameters with each part,
such as operating conditions, quality level, etc.
-x-
3. Identifying special characteristics of parts (number of
gates in an 1C, voltage rating of capacitors, etc.).
4. Applying the above information to tables in MIL-HDBK-
217B.
This detailed procedure does not mean that these modern evalua-
tion methods cannot be misused to provide extravagant reliability
estimates. Misuse may come about through the relatively simple
expedient of minimizing initial design complexity to the point where
the later addition of circuits and components will become necessary in
order to meet performance requirements. Even higher reliability esti-
mates may be had through optimistic parts selection and derating poli-
cies. It should be clear that such unrealistic assumptions are less
likely to be excepted now, given today's standardized estimating
tools.
A part of the early design should include a simulation model
which can be used to test the system performance within its expected
operating environment; however, since real world performance cannot be
predicted precisely, it is important to continue the testing and
updating of this model throughout the design, development, prototype
testing, and early operational phases of the program.
Since any AAS will utilize substantial computer programs to per-
form many of its functions, it is important that potential software
problems be identified and dealt with early in the design. The prob-
lems are frequently traceable to the early conceptual stage and often
result from poor and unrealistic system requirements specification.
It is therefore important that system requirements be subjected to a
vigorous review process.
-xi-
Once a good set of requirements is in hand, then the design and
coding must proceed with great care. Design techniques, organization
structure, and documentation guidelines must be selected that will
foster the production of reliable software and the inevitable software
maintenance that will be required throughout the system's lifetime.
Although the contemporary approach is toward automatic fault
diagnosis, there is still a requirement for some degree of human
interaction in the operation of tests, and in interpretation of test
results. This human interaction in the fault diagnosis process must
also be tested during the development process.
-xiii-
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I. INTRODUCTION
STUDY BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
The need for efficient and safe operation of aircraft in high-
density traffic areas has placed ever increasing demands on the Air
Traffic Control system. Changes in the Air Traffic Control system to
meet these demands have necessitated an increase in the cost and com-
plexity of on-board avionics equipment. This growing complexity has,
in turn, placed increasing requirements on the proficiency and skill
required to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR) in heavy
traffic environments, especially in single-pilot operations.
In 1975, NASA initiated a program in Advanced General Aviation
Avionics Systems (AGAAS) with the objective of developing the informa-
tion needed for industry to produce a reliable, low-cost, advanced
avionics system that will more effectively integrate the high-
performance single-engine and light twin-engine aircraft with the air-
space control system. Emphasis is placed on the use of new technology
to enhance the utility and safety of aircraft during single-pilot IFR
operation in high-density traffic environments. Candidate technolo-
gies include large-scale integrated circuits, microprocessors, new
sensors, displays, data transfer systems, and advanced system archi-
tecture. The aim is to relieve the pilot of many onerous tasks that
can better be done by automated equipment. This will allow the pilot
to concentrate on flying the airplane and to deal with those aspects
of flight safety which are better done by a human than by a machine.
-.
This Working Note describes the study performed by The Rand
Corporation for NASA Ames Research Center on cost/
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reliability/maintainability (CRM) for Advanced General Aviation
Avionics Systems for operation in the 1980s. The study is one of a
number of NASA-sponsored research efforts [1,2,13,14,20,28], involving
different contractors, to develop improvements in avionics for general
aviation aircraft.
The initial objective of the Rand study was to develop a general-
ized methodology for estimating CRM requirements for general aviation
avionics systems operating in the 1980s. This methodology was
intended to be applied to candidate advanced avionics equipment pro-
posed to NASA by various contractors, as well as alternative designs
that might be proposed by NASA. Of particular interest to the study
were the two preliminary candidate advanced avionics systems (PCAAS)
designs proposed by Systems Technology, Incorporated (STI), and South-
ern Illinois University (SIU). These two systems were to be used to
initially test the developed methodologies.
The NASA desire for a method of forecasting CRM for a wide
variety of systems is understandable considering that they have no
control over the types of systems that may be proposed. However, the
broadness of this need places demands upon the methodology that cannot
be satisfied with the available data and techniques. Previous methods
were found unsuitable for a number of reasons, and the lack of data on
current general aviation avionics support costs and reliability
prevented the development of new methodologies. Consequently, the
objective of the Rand study was changed to that of (1) analytically
reviewing the experience of industry and avionics user groups in deal-
ing with CRM predictions, and (2) drawing from this experience gui-
dance for NASA on how CRM requirements for candidate advanced avionics
-3-
systems might be addressed in the absence of a generalized methodol-
ogy-
STUDY APPROACH
A block diagram of a generalized system architecture which was
used as a guideline for this study is shown in Fig. 1-1. This archi-
tecture is sufficiently general in that it adequately matches most
system designs, including the PCAAS design submitted by STI and SIU.
The block diagram was useful in identifying most system components
likely to be encountered in the advanced systems, and it provided a
framework for thinking about component interaction. /
j
In areas where generalized models have been successful in
;
predicting future states and outcomes, the success has been dependent
I
on a number of key elements. The first is the ability to identify the
parameters that affect what is being predicted. The second is/to dis-
cover or uncover some basic relationship between the parameters that
describe or characterize the features being predicted. This is nor-
mally done via physical laws or statistical relationships. '•']
In this study our initial task was to identify the geneyal param-
/;
eters that affect CRM. A number of approaches were used to do this.
f
First, a survey and analysis of past work in developing generalized
models to predict either CRM or similar equipment for avionics was
undertaken. Next, interviews were conducted with manufacturers of
i .
avionics and similar equipment to see just how they dealt with antici-
pated future technology trends and equipment characteristics (includ-i , •i
ing costs), and to find out what they felt were the parameters that
affect CRM. At the same time, a data collection effort was initiated
-4-
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to acquire appropriate cost and reliability data for the purpose of
developing generalized cost and reliability prediction models for
these advanced avionics systems.
The search for information and data included both current stan-
dard avionics system components and those predicated on advanced tech-
nology. It was hypothesized that some system components might remain
essentially the same as those presently available. These might typi-
cally be navigation radios, communications radios, transponders, and
some engine and air data sensors. Certainly hybrid and large-scale
integrated (LSI) circuit technologies will affect the design of radio
systems in the mid-1980s; however, there was no attempt made to evalu-
ate this technological trend quantitatively.
Components considered to be driven primarily by new technologies
are displays, microprocessors (and digital interfaces), memories, mul-
tiple data busses, pilot input devices, and software. Although
microprocessors and memories are used in some general aviation sys-
tems, e.g., area navigation (RNAV), this usage is not widespread and
not a great deal of data is available.
Information and data were sought from many sources. Principal
sources of information investigated were (1) manufacturers of general
aviation avionics equipment, (2) professional general aviation organi-
zations, (3) users of general aviation equipment (including Fixed Base
Operators), (4) manufacturers of general aviation aircraft, (5) Air
Force agencies, (6) government contractors, (7) principal general avi-
ation periodical publications, and (8) library literature searches.
In addition to the above, information on microprocessors,
displays, and bus structure technologies was sought from manufacturers
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and users. A complete list of information sources is included in
Appendix A.
Using a portion of the information collected, we attempted to
develop generalized estimating relationships for predicting purchase
and operating costs of general aviation avionics. For reasons that
are fully discussed in Section II, these attempts were unsuccessful.
REPORT OUTLINE
Although cost, reliability, and maintainability are all closely
interrelated subjects, they are covered in separate sections in this
report. Past work in developing cost-estimating relationships, and an
analysis of cost data collected for contemporary and new technologies,
are covered in Section II. Conclusions on the development and use of
generalized cost estimating relationships (CERs) for advanced avionics
systems for general aviation are included at the end of the section.
Also included in Section II are recommendations as to how one should
proceed when generalized methodologies are not available.
Section III contains a survey of the development of reliability
prediction methods, a discussion of the accuracies and pitfalls in
using the different methods, and ways to apply both prediction and
assessment methodologies where applicable to avionics systems for gen-
eral aviation aircraft that are projected for operation in the 1980s.
Section III ends with conclusions and recommendations on how to
proceed with reliability prediction and assessment in the absence of
parametric methodologies.
The subject of maintainability is covered in Section IV. Mili-
tary and airline experiences are presented, and the applicability of
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this experience to advanced avionics systems for general aviation is
discussed. Conclusions and recommendations on maintenance problems
and philosophy are included at the end of Section IV.
Some potential software problems that might be encountered in
developing an Advanced Avionics System are described in Section V.
The causes of many of the problems are examined, and some generally
accepted guidelines for avoiding them are discussed.
Appendix A contains a list of contacts made during the course of
the study.
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U. COST ANALYSIS OF ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
The objectives of the cost analysis portion of this study were
several. Primarily, methods were desired that could be used to esti-
mate the costs* of the advanced systems. Originally, it was intended
to develop estimating methods for both acquisition costs and mainte-
nance costs. As the study progressed, it became evident that acquisi-
tion costs could not be easily developed. Since maintenance costs are
usually a function of acquisition costs, the explicit development of
estimating relationships for them was dropped. The following discus-
sion therefore only addresses acquisition costs.
The objective was to develop cost estimates that were compara-
tive, in the sense that they could be used to compare the costs of one
system with another system. They were also to be absolute and as
accurate as the design of advanced systems would permit, so that the
costs of any advanced system could be compared with the costs of
existing avionics systems. As a further objective, the desired
methods were to be parametric, so that conceptual avionics systems
could be analyzed from broad descriptive inputs. Thus, the methods
would express cost as a function of such things as output power,
equipment weight, number of transceiver channels, etc. With reference
to the system organization shown in Fig. 1-1, it was hoped that the
generalized parametric relationships would represent the entire avion-
*The word cost, as used in this discussion, refers to the cost of
purchasing an avionics suite, or portions thereof. This "cost" to the
purchaser is equivalent to the "price" of the equipment.
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ics suite; if this proved difficult, they would be developed to
represent discrete portions of the suite. Last, the methodology was
to be able to handle widely differing systems, ranging from those that
are off-the-shelf to those using the most advanced sensors and elec-
tronic techniques.
Past avionics cost studies, as will be seen later, have generally
not been blessed with the same measures of success that accrued to
cost studies of nonelectronic hardware. Because of this, and the very
demanding nature of the study objectives, the cost analysis of
advanced avionics systems posed special problems. It was hoped that
some of the problems that had been incurred in previous avionics stu-
dies resulted from the fact that these studies had dealt almost
exclusively with military avionics, the special nature of which (e.g.,
military performance specifications and rapid technological evolution)
narrowed the data base useful for generalized analysis. If this were
the case, there was the possibility that the characteristics of gen-
eral aviation avionics would be such that they would be more amenable
to cost analysis.
The cost analysis task for the advanced avionics systems (AAS)
posed some interesting problems. As stated above, the principal
objective was to develop a generalized methodology by which the costs
of candidate systems could be estimated and compared. However, a con-
straint was imposed upon the methodology to the effect that the archi-
tecture of the AAS and the technology to be used were undefined.
Therefore, the methodology had to accommodate systems ranging from the
adaptation of existing off-the-shelf equipment (such as proposed by
one subcontractor), to systems that were completely redesigned to use
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integrated electronics and advanced sensors (such as proposed by
another subcontractor), to systems that were open-ended regarding the
technology used.
Costs can be estimated at several stages in the life of a system,
including a stage prior to its actual design, but different kinds of
data are required to develop the different kinds of relationships that
are used. The development of cost estimating relationships (CERs)
that would apply to avionics equipment of different technologies and
different states of the art would require that the data base for the
CERs be composed of these various technologies. Alternatively,
separate CERs could be developed for each separate statistical popula-
tion (i.e., each distinct technology and/or state of the art); The
latter would, in this case, require a set of CERs for existing equip-
ment, and sets of CERs based on future equipment that used new or
presently unused technologies. This is possible, at least conceptu-
ally, as long as the technologies or other major characteristics are
well defined. To the extent that they are open-ended, the task cannot
be done. Further, the development of CERs for future technologies
may, of necessity, rely either upon smaller data bases or upon other
techniques (e.g., engineering analogy) that cannot have the same
degree of certainty as those used with sound data. This is simply a
fact of life in the development of CERs, which tend to be good when a
lot is known about the subject, and less satisfactory when less is
known.
Since cost analysts occasionally face this problem, i.e., the
question of comparing something about which a great deal is known with
some future replacement about which fairly little is known, how do
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they deal with it? In part, a situation such as this is not a com-
fortable one. The ideal analysis is one that relies upon CERs that
describe a continuum of equipment that includes all types to be com-
pared. With such CERs, the analyst has a degree of confidence that
the basic relationships between costs and the parameters contained in
the CER are well quantified.
If CERs of this type are unavailable, other means of coping with
the problem are needed. In the case of the AAS, some of the technol-
ogy is not new, but is simply used in a new application, i.e., the
application of LSI circuitry to an entire integrated avionics system.
For this case, estimates of cost may be made by using an approach that
breaks the system down into components, estimates their costs, and
sums them. The success of this method depends on the detail that is
known about the system and on one's ability to understand the general
relationships that exist between component part costs and the various
other manufacturing and marketing steps that lead to a retail price.
Where the technology is new, and where there are no prior applica-
tions, costs or prices cannot be estimated by any systematic method.
In this study, we attempted to develop CERs for the acquisition
costs of existing equipment, so that AAS designs incorporating present
equipment could be accommodated. We also examined the new technolo-
gies expected to be used in other AAS systems and attempted to develop
CERs for them. Where there were unknowns, due to unknown technolo-
gies, we have tried to present some perspective on likely costs.
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SURVEY OF PAST STUDIES ON COSTING
Any discussion of past cost studies on avionics equipment must be
prefaced by the comment that virtually all such studies have con-
sidered military avionics only. Because the cost of military avionics
is usually substantially higher than the cost of nonmilitary avionics,
such studies would be expected to be useful in a qualitative sense
only. From these studies, it would be hoped to discern which equip-
ment characteristics or descriptors relate to the cost of the equip-
ment, and the general form of the relationship. Given that the rela-
tionships are valid ones, it might then be expected that similar rela-
tionships, with different cost coefficients, would exist for non-
military avionics, and that the main task facing the cost analyst
would be one of deriving the correct cost coefficients.
This hope of being able to "piggyback" on studies of military
avionics costs is largely a vain one. Of the studies that were
reviewed, few were found that could be directly related to general
aviation avionics. In fact, remarkably little successful work has
been done in the field of military avionics cost analysis, despite the
fact that all of the cost data ought to be publicly available, and
that there is an avid interest in the subject. Reasons for this will
be discussed below, but the general implications of the lack of back-
ground need to be understood in the context of this study.
The military studies that have been made largely involve data for
existing avionic equipment, and were aimed at the creation of CERs for
that equipment. Thus, the added dimension of attempting to anticipate
new technologies did not exist to the same degree as it did for this
study. Despite this possible easier task, few of the studies reviewed
-13-
were able to generate satisfactory CERs. The implications of this go
beyond the inability to use military avionics studies as a jumping-off
place—they say a great deal about the task itself and the prospects
for successful results. This is especially true because relevant data
for general aviation avionics is less extensive and detailed than for
military electronics, and because the technologies that are to be
expected for the AAS are liable to be new and different from those
used by the military.
The major interest in developing military avionics CERs has come
from the Department of Defense (DoD); but the individual services have
also expressed an interest, usually through contractors. A descrip-
tion of the studies that have been made follows. To give a more com-
plete idea of the climate surrounding these studies, not only are the
studies themselves described, but where no effort has been made, this
is also discussed.
It will be seen that success has been rare in these endeavors.
One of the basic reasons is that electronic equipment is peculiar in
that a desired function can be produced by a wide variety of elec-
tronic means, each of which has its own circuitry and associated
parts. Devices with similar, if not exact, performance capability,
can have very different internal components, and therefore very dif-
ferent manufacturing costs. They also can have different maintenance
problems and costs. Because of the latitude that appears to exist in
the design and construction of electronic equipment, one of the basic
premises of developing useful CERs becomes tenuous. CERs are based on
an assumed relationship between cost and physical and performance
parameters. If this relationship does not exist, or cannot be
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uncovered because the data include a wide variety of different basic
designs, then attempts to develop CERs will fail. The failure will be
due to the fact that costs are really related not to physical and per-
formance parameters, which may be well documented, but to circuit,
component, and construction parameters about which there may be little
or nothing published.
Studies by the Department of Defense
The interests of DoD have mainly been channeled through the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Planning and Evaluation
(OASD/PA&E), and its predecessor organizations. One study, conducted
by Resource Management Corporation (RMC), began in 1969, and a final
report was issued in 1972. The study produced partially useful CERs
for radar and fire control systems, but CERs for other equipment were
less successful. For many pieces of equipment, the only significant
independent variable was weight, which is not a very useful parameter
for analysis, particularly of conceptual equipment. Basic problems in
the study concerned data. At the study outset, it was decided that
collecting the data from contractors involved an effort beyond the
scope of the intended study. In lieu of this detailed information,
budgetary and funding data were used which unfortunately contained an
undifferentiated mixture of R&D and production funds. The poor
results of parts of the study are partially due to the use of non-
homogeneous data in developing CERs.
Rand became specifically involved in the collection of military
avionics performance, physical characteristics, and cost data for
OASD/PA&E in 1975, concentrating on the avionics suites of tactical
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combat aircraft developed since 1965. Data were collected on indivi-
dual pieces of equipment from manufacturers, the DoD data banks, and
from the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. It was hoped
that these data could be aggregated in such a way that they could be
cross-checked with budgetary data for the aircraft systems involved.
A great deal of data were collected, and some analyses were made. It
was found that when an attempt was made to create homogeneous samples
of equipment from which statistical analyses could be made, the sample
size was reduced to the point where the analysis lost meaning. One of
the study conclusions was that the addition of data from other types
of military aircraft might expand the data base sufficiently for
analysis to produce CERs.
Rand also performed an analysis of USAF aircraft avionics recov-
erable spares, and developed a CER. The relationship is based on the
number of aircraft and the avionics subsystem flyaway cost, and has an
input that is a technology indicator.
General Research Corporation developed a complex parametric CER
for ground based radars. The CER uses about 30 inputs, many of which
require detailed knowledge of the device. This is not an avionics
CER, but it is interesting from two points of view. It is electronic
equipment, as are avionics, and its success is partly due to the large
number of detailed inputs that are required. In this way, it
approaches the concept of an engineering cost estimate, where detailed
knowledge of the components is required.
Planning Research Corporation conducts military analyses that
sometimes require avionics cost estimates. They generally make such
estimates based on analogous systems. The extent to which estimates
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of this type are successful depends on the type of analysis that is
involved. Where the avionics costs themselves are not under analysis,
they are probably satisfactory. However, if the object is to examine
(for example) the cost effects of varying the parameters of the avion-
ics themselves, these types of estimates are unsatisfactory.
Air Force and NASA Studies on Avionics CERs
The Air Force Systems Command has been interested in avionics
CERs in its Aeronautical System Division (ASD) and its Electronics
System Division (ESD). Reliable, formal avionics CERs have not been
developed in either division, however. Further, since most of their
needs are for relatively near term equipment, they have been able to
use the RCA PRICE model described more fully on p. 18 [18]. Typical
applications of avionics costs include the life-cycle cost analysis of
projects such as DAIS,* in which time phased acquisition and O&M costs
are compared for competing pieces of hardware to determine minimum
life cycle costs. DAIS uses a well developed life cycle cost metho-
dology, but the equipment costs inputs to this methodology are sup-
plied by the equipment contractors. These, in turn, develop their
cost estimates by industrial engineering techniques using prototypes,
or they use the PRICE model.
General Research Corporation (GRC) has also done work for the Air
Force Avionics Laboratory on developing CERs for avionics. Their
first effort resulted in suggested CERs for fire control radars, iner-
tial navigators, computers, and doppler navigation radars [4].
^Digital Avionics Information System.
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The CER that was produced for computers in the GRC study
attempted to take into account the rapid pace of technological change
in this field by adjusting the data base not only to 1974 dollars, but
to 1974 technology. The CER produced thus reflects only 1974 technol-
ogy and is incapable of estimating the costs of future technologies
without using a suitable technology change factor. With technology
changing as rapidly as it is in the computer field, estimating this
factor may be difficult. This point not withstanding, the CER itself
is based largely on the weight of the computer, but it also includes
inputs concerning the computational speed, memory, size, etc.
GRC, in a study for NASA Houston, published in 1975, examined 31
airborne and spaceborne computers, and developed two CERs, neither of
which was developed from a data base applicable to the AAS. The first
was for memory cost, and is stated as
Ln(memory cost, in dollars per bit) = 8.119 - 0.I49(year-1900)
The second concerned central processing units (CPUs) and related their
costs to the date of development, word length, speed, number of
bidirectional I/O channels, and whether or not the unit is a space
application. Both of these CERs were developed from a data base of
expensive units, the cost of which ranged from $32,000 to $683,000.
It was judged that this data base was out of the cost range of the
equipment to be used in the AAS.
The Air Force is also an indirect sponsor of avionics cost-
estimating activities through the companies that manufacture its air-
craft. Lockheed is an example, especially with their series of
antisubmarine warfare airplanes. However, CERs do not serve the kinds
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of needs that Lockheed feels it has, and therefore it has neither
developed nor used them.
Navy Studies on Avionics
The Naval Air Development Center (NADC) has been engaged in the
development of avionics CERs for some time. The Center mounted an
extensive effort involving avionic computer systems in 1970 and 1971.
This effort resulted in a cost-by-function model that is based on a
design-engineered approach. It works by using the input parameters to
design and assemble a hypothetical computer to handle the functional
load. Then, from a data bank, the model retrieves data on related
existing equipment. The data that most closely approximate the system
under evaluation are used as a baseline for cost extrapolation. This
system depends on the data base, and the limitations in data have res-
tricted the utility of the model. In concept, however, the model is
similar to the RCA PRICE model.
NADC is continuing its avionics cost work at the present time,
under joint Navy and NASA funding. Their objective is to determine
top-level avionics costs for various categories of military aircraft,
so that they can project future trends and assess probable avionics
costs for different mission aircraft. They are presently almost fin-
ished with data collection, and analysis will follow. The tools that
they intend to use are stated to be:
Experience and expertise
Basic theoretical relationships
Existing CERs
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PRICE model
Designer experience and projections
At the present time there is little that can be used from this
effort.
Other Defense Efforts
The most notable effort has been by RCA Defense Avionics, where
the PRICE model [18] was developed. PRICE is a proprietary model that
requires the user to attend a special school prior to its use, and
payment to RCA for its use. As mentioned above, the PRICE model is
widely used for the estimation of military avionics costs.
Much of the model is based on data from RCA's own records and
includes other "firms' equipment. (There are over 6000 items in the
file.) There are 56 model inputs that are used to describe the equip-
ment for which costs are to be estimated. The inputs are either com-
plexity factors or physical characteristics. Some are mandatory, oth-
ers can be calculated by the model. Some are calculated by the model
regardless of whether or not they have been provided as an input,
e.g., engineering performance schedule complexity factor, total com-
ponent count, etc. This provides a check and balance to the accuracy
of the system descriptors used as inputs.
Unfortunately for the novice user, over 75 percent of the inputs
appear to require the user's judgment with regard to the complexity of
such things as structure, electronic circuitry, and level of engineer-
ing technological improvement. The model is apparently so general
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that there is no requirement to specify the type or general class of
equipment for which costs are desired. Little is known about the
basis of PRICE, other than the statement by its developers that it is
based on a dollar per pound relationship. Without being able to look
at the data base used and the equations (standards) developed, it is
impossible to determine the statistical validity of the model. How-
ever, whether or not the model is statistically sound, results from an
earlier NASA study, shown in Fig. II-l, indicate that in the hands of
an experienced operator the model can provide estimates that are close
to actual realized costs.
The subject of previous avionics studies can be summarized as
follows:
o Most studies of military avionics have not resulted in
the development of broadly useful parametric CERs. None
were found that could be used in this study.
o No previous CER studies of civilian avionics were located.
o The problems inherent in developing avionics CERS stem
from the fact that a given function may be produced
by a variety of electronic methods of widely varying cost.
This obviates the required relationship between functions
and costs. The problem is generally manifested by the
discovery that the published data on the equipment is
often not related to its cost, and that conversely, the
cost determinants of the equipment are often unpublished.
The conclusion of our search for existing tools to assist in the study
is that they do not exist. What tools are required must be developed.
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Equipment
ATCA
DECA
RR Radar
Transponder
Landing Radar
Laser Altimeter
VHF Transceiver (LM)
VHF Transceiver (CSM)
VHF Transceiver (LM)
Ranging Mod.
VHF Transceiver (CSM)
Ranging Mod.
PRICE
Computer
11,538
4,834
55,966
18,553
32,997
2,430
6,570
3,968
2,645
1,728
Program
Actuals
13,096
5,114
61,420
20,244
35,776
2,962
6,258
4,091
2,758
1,768
Adjusted
Actuals
12,076
4,784
58,561
19,300
33,776
2,568
6,258
4,091
2,748
1,768
Net
Variance
-4.5%
+1.1%
-4.6%
-4.3%
-2.3%
-5.4%
+5.0%
-3 . 0%
-4.1%
-2.3%
SOURCE: Frank Freiman, RCA Avionics Cost/Schedule Study, NAS 9-12356, 1972.
NOTE: Program Actuals Compared with PRICE Computer Runs—Flight Hardware
($000)
Fig. II-l—Example of estimation precision obtained by RCA PRICE model
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERS
Review of previous work revealed that significant problems
existed in the development of avionics CERs. Also, a review of the
two Preliminary Candidate Advanced Avionics Systems (PCAAS) developed
for NASA by Southern Illinois University (SIU) and Systems Technology,
Inc., (STI) [13,14] showed that two extremes were represented. One of
the PCAAS was designed around existing components available off the
shelf, and the other was a completely integrated system designed to
function as a single unit. As explained in the Introduction, a cost-
estimating method that treated the entire avionics suite as an entity
was highly desirable. However, data on complete entities do not
exist, and therefore a historical base from which to start is lacking.
Further, the exact problem that has been discussed concerning dif-
ferent ways to achieve the same performance is presented by the two
PCAAS systems. One resembles a grouping of familiar avionics com-
ponents that have been hooked together to perform as a unit. The
other resembles nothing that a general aviation pilot has heretofore
seen, since it has been designed as a totally new unit. Yet both
presumably serve the same function. A single cost-estimating method
cannot accommodate both suites; they are simply too different.
Because of this, we approached the development of CERs in two ways.
First we attempted to develop CERs for off-the-shelf equipment,
with the intention of using these CERs for those PCAAS that could be
identified as being made up of existing components, in contrast to a
completely integrated system. Then, for those PCAAS that were
designed as integral units, we attempted to develop a different set of
CERs. Both of these efforts will be described in detail below.
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With two different cost-estimating methods, consistency of esti-
mates could be expected when like systems were being compared, i.e.,
when one system made up of off-the-shelf components was compared with
a similar system, or when integrated design systems were compared with
each other. This type of consistency disappears, though, when systems
of different design, that each require a different cost method, are
compared. The analyst must understand this, and must balance the
problem of having no estimates to compare with the fact that different
methods probably produce results that are only qualitatively compara-
tive.
When one CER is used to estimate the costs of two or more sys-
tems, the cost differences are consistent from one comparison to
another because the CER translates the functional inputs into cost
outputs according to the algorithms built into it. If one CER is used
to estimate the costs of one piece of equipment and a different CER is
used to estimate the costs of another, the cost differences observed
may not be due to differences in functional inputs. This is usually
caused by the fact that the CERs have different inputs, and the cost
estimates are then based on different parameters. An example of this
important point will illustrate it. Suppose that there are two kinds
of commercially available transmitters, each using a different tech-
nology. For one kind, a good CER might result from relating cost to
power output. For the other, the best that can be done might be to
relate cost to weight. Now suppose that we want to compare the costs
of the two types based on their power output. Clearly if this is to
be done, the analyst must be able to translate power output into
weight for the second kind of transmitter. But if he could do that,
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he probably could have developed a CER based on power in the first
place. On the other hand, if all of the transmitters were of the
first kind, the CER would be the embodiment of the change in cost as a
function of a change in power. The use of single CERs is more mean-
ingful in making consistent comparisons.
The above discussion presumes that the data bases for developing
both kinds of CERs were equally good. Seldom is this the case.
Therefore the problems are compounded, even when the different CERs
are more similar than those mentioned above. Poor data bases produce
poor CERs; good data bases may produce good ones. Comparisons of
costs that are estimated by using both good CERs and poor CERs will
have associated low levels of confidence.
CERs--Existing Avionics Equipment
The previous section mentioned that one PCAAS design already sub-
mitted to NASA was based on off-the-shelf components. The use of a
CER to estimate the prices of these components is clearly inappropri-
ate, because the prices are known exactly. However, CERs based on
existing equipment can serve an extremely useful purpose. They pro-
vide the analyst with the tools necessary to perform a sensitivity
analysis, and to answer questions of how costs may change as some of
the performance features are altered. They allow the analyst to com-
pare systems with different characteristics (such as power output) by
equalizing them through the use of a CER to the same power output.
They also allow the conceptual design of a system that is composed of
components that are similar to, but not exactly the same as, off-the-
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shelf items. Based on this utility, we attempted to develop CERs
based on commercially available avionics equipment.
We began the effort by obtaining data from the April issues of
Business and Commercial Aviation, and from manufacturers' literature.
We used data for the years 1973, 1975, 1976, and 1977 (1974 data were
not available in time). These data were segregated by class of equip-
ment, i.e., transceivers, transponders, etc., and all listed attri^-
butes were coded and entered into machine storage. Statistical ana-
lyses of the data were then made by using a multiple regression
analysis program to test preliminary hypotheses about cost/performance
relationships.
Analyses were made of communications transceivers, transponders,
navigation transceivers, and distance-measuring equipment. The
results of these analyses were unsatisfactory in several respects, as
follows:
1. No sensitivity to the model year of the equipment was
indicated. Thus, cost trends could not be established,
and the effects of changing designs, manufacturing
techniques, and new technologies, which ordinarily
would be expected to show up as a time trend, were
unobserved. This might be implied to mean that
manufacturers hold prices (in current dollars)
relatively constant, and absorb the effects of infla-
tion through economies resulting from the use of new
technologies. Our interviews indicated that this
process not only took place, but that greater
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capability was continually being built into the equip-
ment as well, as a result of changing technology that
allowed this to be done without increasing prices.
2. The only explanatory variables that were consistently
significant in the regression equations were power
and weight, and these frequently explained only a small
part of the data variance. There are some limited cases
in which these two variables would be useful in a cost
analysis, especially if there were other variables in
the equation as well. But when one or the other of them
is the only variable that has significance, the
regression equation is almost useless. It does an
analyst little good to know how the price of a
navigation transceiver varies with its weight, when what
he really wants to know is how its price varies with its
performance.
3. Where equations were developed that included the
limited variables discussed above, they frequently
produced results that duplicated the data inputs with
a margin that was judged to be too wide—plus or
minus one-third was typical.
The poor results were attributed to the major problem of coupling
price data to the listed physical and performance characteristics of
the equipment. For communication transceivers, we had the following
numerical data to work with:
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Year model
Number of channels
Power output
Number of boxes
Weight
Price
Manufacturer
But there were numerous other features that were available on
some of the transceivers in the data sample. For example, included as
listed variables were such features as:
Remote mounted power amplifier
Blue/white lighting
Self test
TSO categories
Automatic squelch
Speaker amplifier
Storage and recall of additional frequencies
Electronic frequency readout
Portable battery pack option
Dual frequency selector
Self-contained cabin amplifier
Automatic voice leveling
Then there were other variations that were not listed, such as basic
differences in circuit approaches, etc. Costs were judged to be more
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a function of attributes of the equipment items that were not listed,
and which are probably nonnumeric (circuit design is an example), than
of the descriptors that are available. As a result, the statistical
analysis of the data was terminated.
ANALYSIS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
New technologies applicable to the AAS were identified in two
ways. The more direct means of identification was through examination
of the two specifications for the PCAAS that were submitted by the
NASA subcontractors. The STI specification used more elements that
can be described as "off-the-shelf" items than did the SIU specifica-
tion. Even so, the individual pieces of equipment were tied together
by a bus structure and fed into the central processor unit. Both the
bus and the LSI circuitry of the CPU can be considered as relatively
new technologies to general aviation, especially on the scale of the
PCAAS. The SIU specification, on the other hand, uses far fewer
"off-the-shelf" items. It incorporates the bus structure and relies
heavily on LSI circuitry. In addition, it uses a flat plate area
plasma display, and has provisions for advanced sensors.
The second means of identifying new technologies was through the
manufacturers that were visited. In some cases, the visits were made
specifically for the purpose of looking at new technologies. In oth-
ers, the visits were for other purposes, but information about new
technologies emerged during the discussions.
All technologies that were identified were considered applicable
to the AAS. In general, the technologies that were considered were
grouped as follows:
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LSI and microprocessors
Displays (mainly flat plate displays)
Bus structure, with associated interfaces
Sensors
Software (this will be the subject of a separate later
discussion)
Information about LSI and microprocessor technology was taken from
current literature, and from studies that have been performed for NASA
on the subject. This information was supplemented by visits to pro-
ducers and users of this type of equipment, as well as to avionics
manufacturers. Intel Corporation, Hewlett-Packard, Delco, and Collins
Radio are examples of organizations that provided helpful information.
Displays are the subject of great interest by avionics manufac-
turers, and a variety of technologies are being pursued. Most of
these however, are being pursued for use as alphanumeric displays.
Area displays are much less frequently encountered, and where they
are, they are under investigation for military use. Most information
on displays originated from Delco and Hughes, as well as from the
literature.
Bus structures are analogous to LSI in many ways. They are in
use at the present time, their parameters are well known, and they are
subject to fairly dynamic forces that result from technological
improvements, manufacturing changes, and market pressures. All of
these indicate lower future costs. Hewlett Packard, who manufactures
an IEEE 488 bus, provided most of the information.
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Sensors were found to be the most promising but least-well-
defined area regarding technological change with associated cost
changes. The situation was best described by one person who said that
the manufacture of sensors was "moving into the 1C houses." The prob-
lem is not simple though, because there is such a diversity of promis-
ing technologies, and because knowledge of many of these technologies
is so new and so small that it is difficult to say which are the most
promising. In aggregate, all indications are that there are many
changes on the horizon, and that these changes almost universally are
harbingers of more accurate and lower-cost sensors that are free of
mechanical maintenance problems.
LSI/Microprocessors
The most common method of estimating costs in this fast-moving
technology is by piece parts count. Attempts to use functional
characteristics founder on the rate of change in the technology.
What required an entire printed circuit board yesterday, will require
only one LSI chip tomorrow. While this concentration of processing
power is occurring, the cost of circuit boards remains about constant.
It is for this reason that the piece parts count makes good sense, and
gives good results. The method has other attractions as well. Piece
parts are assembled into printed circuit (PC) boards of a given size
and complexity. PC boards of like size and complexity are found to
have similar piece parts costs, and therefore similar costs per board.
It is common for people "in the industry" to talk of PC board prices
(which are a multiple of costs) of about $1000 per board, whether the
boards are for one specific application or another. It is also common
-31-
for industry sources to say that the retail price of an item is equal
to eight times the piece part cost. This multiple takes into account
labor, overhead, G&A, profit, distribution and sales costs. The exact
amount of each of these factors may vary from company to company, but
the results appear to be surprisingly uniform in aggregate.
PC boards do vary in both size and complexity, and these vari-
ables can be taken into account in the piece part count, while still
using the rule of thumb that the finished PC board will sell for eight
times the piece part cost (e.g., if the piece parts have a cost of
$100, the PC board will sell for $800).
These relationships have been used in both the STI and STU
specifications of the PCAAS. SIU derived a relationship of price = 10
times piece parts count, which is probably conservative, based on the
industry criteria stated above, and used this relationship to estimate
the cost of their PCAAS. Using a multiple of ten versus a multiple of
eight can be viewed as a means of hedging on the accuracy of the piece
parts count, which has some inherent uncertainties at the stage of
design used by SIU. If their final design required 25 percent more
piece parts, their cost estimate would probably still be valid.
STI used these relationships in a less rigorous manner, but still
appropriately. Virtually all of their system was designed to use com-
mercially available parts, including the PC boards for the central
processing unit. However, there were a few PC boards that were not
commercially available, and the price of these boards required estima-
tion. This estimation was made by comparing the size, complexity, and
piece parts count of these not commercially available boards with
those that were commercially available, and then deciding that they
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were sufficiently similar so that the prices would be similar. These
PC boards, interestingly enough, are priced in the $200-$300 range,
indicating that they are less complex than the boards generally used
in the avionics industry. It was mentioned above that $1000 per PC
board was a common number. The actual numbers obtained from each com-
pany are as follows:
Company A, MIL SPEC boards $1000 - $1500
Company B $ 800 - $1000
Company C $ 600 - $1000
The relationship between piece parts cost and retail price was given
as follows:
Company C - Retail price = 8 x piece parts cost
Company D - Retail price = 8 x piece parts cost
Company A - Government price = 4 x piece parts cost, and
government price = 1/2 retail price
The above relationships must be qualified in that they do not
implicitly contain a measure of performance. It was mentioned earlier
that the performance of LSI circuitry is increasing rapidly, and thus
a task that requires two or more PC boards today may require one or
less tomorrow, and the price of the board may be no different. This
effect is automatically taken into account if the piece parts count is
used; but if estimates are being made for the future, it is then
necessary to estimate how the piece parts count will change in the
intervening period, or how the performance of the PC boards will
change. Projections of this type are difficult to make because the
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present rate of change is very high, and the degree to which it will
continue appears to be very uncertain. Figure II-2 was taken from a
Honeywell study of computer technology that was performed for NASA.
This figure indicates these large rates of change, and could be inter-
preted that there will be price changes of factors of two or more
between now and 1980. But the figure is a straight-line projection on
a logarithmic scale, and such extrapolations are often suspect.
Whether quantitatively correct or not, the indications are uncontested
that whatever the cost estimate is for a given microcomputer today, it
will cost less, and probably substantially less, in the 1980s.
Displays
The only area displays that are presently in use in aircraft are
CRT displays, which are used primarily for radar. Their costs are
well established, and such displays can be considered an off-the-shelf
item. Flat plate area displays are mostly in the research stage. The
Honeywell report sums up the status of these displays by stating "none
of the various flat-plate matrix displays under development are ready
for application to general aviation." This opinion was shared by the
equipment manufacturers. Delco, for example, is working with various
types of alphanumeric flat plate display technologies, and much
currently available general aviation avionic equipment uses
alphanumeric displays. No one was found to be working with flat plate
area displays for use in civilian aircraft, but Hughes Aircraft Com-
pany is deeply committed to liquid crystal display (LCD) panels, which
they perceive as having their first use in military aircraft.
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Some cost information is available for alphanumeric displays,
which is presented in Fig. II-3. No cost information is available for
flat plat area displays suitable for aircraft use. These displays are
still under development, and are not expected to be used by military
aircraft until the early 1980's. Subsequent to this use, they may be
expected to be available for civilian avionics application.
Bus Structure
As mentioned above, busses are in common use, and prices are
known for both the cables and the interface circuits. These prices
were stated by one manufacturer to be as follows:
Cable lengths: 1 meter $60
2 meters $65
4 meters $70
Interface circuits: $150 to $1000
What is more interesting to speculate about is the future price
of the interface circuits, since they consist of LSI, MSI, and hybrid
circuits, which are subject to the same cost reduction forces that
have been identified above. In this respect, the manufacturer
hazarded a guess that the retail price of the least expensive inter-
faces would reach as low as about $50 in the 1980's, and that their
manufacturing cost would be well below $10. If the relationship
described earlier of 8 x piece parts cost = retail price is applied,
then a $50 retail price implies piece parts costs of about $6, and
total manufacturing costs would probably be as they described—well
below $10. Also, they are essentially projecting a retail price
reduction from $150 to $50 over the next 5 years or so (in the
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1980's). This projection would appear to be consistent with experi-
ence with new, solid state electronics circuits.
Sensors
The prices of present sensors are well known, and if these sen-
sors are used in a PCAAS, as was done by STI, there is no problem in
estimating them. If, on the other hand, advanced sensors are to be
used, there is presently no cost information available. But our
interviews made it clear that sensor technology is on the threshold of
dynamic changes that will probably reduce acquisition costs substan-
tially, improve quality, and reduce maintenance costs.
Attitude sensors will probably undergo the most profound changes.
There are a number of different technologies that offer promise.
Prominent among them are ring lasers and resonant quartz "bells." In
the latter, strap-down quartz bells are excited to their resonant fre-
quency. When the attitude of the bell changes, it causes a displace-
ment between the standing wave on the bell and the position of the
bell. This displacement can be measured as a minute capacitance
change, and reported as the appropriate change in attitude. No moving
parts are used, and the entire sensor is electronic. Development of
this device by Delco is in its infancy, but it was suggested that the
device would reduce gyro costs substantially. Personnel at Collins
Radio also concurred that by the 1980s, mechanical attitude sensors
would be a thing of the past, and that whatever nonmechanical system
(or systems) would be in use would be much less expensive than present
systems.
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There are many pressure sensors on an aircraft, and there are
presently two nonmechanical devices that are likely contenders. One
is a resonant quartz crystal that pressure acts on to change the
resonant frequency. A digital frequency counter completes the system.
Collins Radio feels that this device would work far better than
mechanical devices, and that it has the potential of eventually cost-
ing the same.
Honeywell has a piezoelectric pressure sensor that relies on a
silicon diaphram with resistors, similar to a strain gage. There is a
problem with this device, since it is temperature sensitive, and the
temperature-induced output is substantially larger than the pressure-
induced output. This problem has resulted in the use of sophisticated
bridge circuits, plus software "calibration" for the individual unit.
However, Honeywell feels that this sensor has the potential of being
very cheap.
J-Tech, of Cedar Rapids, has developed an airspeed indicator that
is based on a pipe with a post in it. A vortex forms behind the post,
and then moves away from it and dies out. The number of vorticies
formed per unit time is a function of the airspeed. An electro-optic
vortex counter completes the instrument.
The sensors used in the STI specification are off-the-shelf
items, and their prices are known. SIU uses off-the-shelf attitude
sensors (gyros) but specifies no particular kind of pressure sensors.
Instead they advocate voltage-controlled oscillator devices for which
they have allowed $55 per sensor in their estimate. At the moment,
there are no cost data on advanced sensors. The development of cost-
estimating relationships for advanced sensors must wait until the
technologies evolve further, and data become available. Until that
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time, the only guide to sensor costs is industry's belief that they
will probably be lower than the cost of today's equipment.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The investigation into the development of generalized cost-
estimating methods for general aviation avionics found that:
o Previous attempts to develop avionics CERs had only
limited success.
o Attempts to develop a single methodology were precluded
because of lack of data and the problem of dealing with
as yet undefined future technologies.
o The development of different methodologies for the two
PCAAS systems already proposed to NASA was unsuccessful
in the context of the creation of parametric relation-
ships that expressed costs as a function of physical
and performance parameters. This failure was due to the
lack of significant statistical relationships among the
variables tested.
o A number of estimating methods, rules of thumb, and
industry practices were collected which can be of
assistance in analyzing equipment costs.
Because parametric relationships could not be developed, esti-
mates of the acquisition and maintenance cost of advanced avionics
suites must rely on techniques that are based on piece parts counts.
The use of these techniques will allow the cost data for one system to
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be compared with the cost data of other systems. The ability to per-
form sensitivity analysis will be limited, or nonexistent.
NASA cannot predict the types of designs that may be submitted,
or what technologies might be incorporated into the designs. There-
fore, NASA should require that each submission be accompanied by a
contractor's prepared estimate of users' purchase price, maintenance
philosophy, and maintenance cost estimates. These estimates should be
backed up by a description of the cost-estimating methodology used,
and a listing of all factors and analogous and corroborative data.
The description should be sufficiently complete to duplicate and
evaluate the estimate. Estimates prepared in this way will most
likely be engineering estimates that rely upon piece parts count,
piece parts prices, and manufacturing labor cost estimates.
The inputs to these cost estimates can be reviewed for their rea-
sonableness and completeness, or, in the case of technologies that are
not yet commercialized, for evidence that the estimate made is defen-
sible. Estimates made in this manner can be used to make comparisons
among the various designs that are submitted, provided it is under-
stood that the estimating methods used for different levels of design
will probably have widely differing (and unknown) estimating accuracy.
Therefore, comparisons that are made should stress general cost ranges
rather than exact differences among estimates; they should concen-
trate, wherever possible, on uncertainties in the estimates. These
uncertainties could be of critical importance where the technology is
new, or is noncommercial, or where either the piece parts count or
prices appear to be subject to doubt. For some systems, it may be
possible for the contractor to submit the estimate in disaggregated
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forra, so that cost comparisons may be made by functional subdivisions,
i.e., transceivers, transponder, etc. For integrated designs, this
disaggregation may be impractical, but at least the hardware and
software may be separated.
System integration, particularly for systems that are made up of
off-the-shelf components, is likely to be one of the driving costs,
and NASA should request that this subject and the subject of software
be addressed explicitly and in detail.
Using the above techniques, certain assessment of costs is possi-
ble. However, the ability to perform some types of analysis will be
constrained by the fact that these estimates will rely upon engineer-
ing cost estimates. That will be particularly true in the case of
sensitivity analysis, where functional relationships are more useful
than parts counts. As an example, consider two designs, one of which
is clearly superior to the other, but which has a higher estimated
initial cost. Suppose that the superior design has a higher tran-
sceiver output than the other design, and that the additional power is
judged, unnecessary. A reasonable question to ask is how the cost of
the better unit might change if the transceiver power were reduced.
With the right kind of parametric relationship, this exercise would be
simple. Without such a relationship, the exercise cannot be done
unless the unit is redesigned and a reestimate is made based on the
new piece parts count and description. This example serves to illus-
trate that each estimate that is considered represents one point on a
curve that describes cost as a function of various parameters. Having
the functional relationship gives the analyst an understanding of
cause and effect, and the ability to test the cost sensitivity to
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changes in the values of the parameters. When it is not possible to
develop these functions, as for the MS, simpler comparisons are pos-
sible, and often sufficient.
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III. RELIABILITY OF ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEMS
This section will briefly describe the state of the art of relia-
bility prediction and reliability assessment for avionics equipment.
It will be shown that there is currently no comprehensive and
trustworthy methodology for achieving the desired predictive capabil-
ity discussed in Section I of this report. Furthermore, the lack of
any significant amount of data on reliability and maintainability of
current avionics systems used in general aviation makes it impossible
to develop new prediction methods responsive to the objectives of this
study. It will be seen, however, that even within these recognized
and substantial limitations, reliability prediction and assessment can
be accomplished to a worthwhile degree, particularly in the important
aspect of comparing either the projected or achieved reliability of
two or more competing designs, and also in identifying those portions
of any single design which have a disproportionate likelihood of being
troublesome.
This section will address these several facets of reliability,
including reliability prediction, design reliability, quality control,
environmental factors, and maintenance (though most aspects of the
last-mentioned subject are in Section IV). In order to accomplish as
much as possible in these matters, we have chosen not to restrict our
sources of information to general aviation per se, but to incorporate
commercial and Air Force experience wherever it seems appropriate. In
the case of the Air Force experience, some specific reasons for
including this information will be given later.
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WHAT IS RELIABILITY?
Reliability has been defined as the probability of failure-free
operation within the design performance limits for a given period of
time under specified operating conditions. Reliability is usually
expressed as a decimal fraction or as a percentage of uptime to total
time (this latter quantity should more correctly be labeled availabil-
ity). Conversely, unreliability is the probability of a failure dur-
ing a given period of time. Many times it is useful to express the
reliability of a device in terms of mean time between failures (MTBF),
which is the average hours of operation between failures as measured
on a sample group of units for an extended period of time. It should
be emphasized that MTBF and reliability are not synonymous terms.
However, a precise mathematical relationship does exist between them.
For a fair variety of situations, including most involving electronic
equipment, a reliability equation can be written which illustrates the
most general parameter relationships:
m
R = e
where R is the reliability, less than or equal to 1.0,
t is the required time of operation, usually hours, and
m is the mean time between failures.
The equation shows that only two routes to improved reliability
are possible: reduce the operating time, or increase the MTBF. Since
the former is usually not possible, the importance of the latter is
made clear. This and other terms for quantifying reliability and the
-45-
relationships between them are discussed in detail later in this sec-
tion.
Although reliability engineering as a discipline has been esta-
blished for over 20 years, there are still many areas that are not
well understood, and many problem areas lack formal approaches to
solution. The major areas of reliability science are reliability
prediction, design for reliability, reliability measurement, and reli-
ability improvement. The most common misconception in this regard is
that a given level of reliability is built into a piece of equipment
when it leaves the factory, and that built-in reliability is what the
user, on the average, can expect. However, this is not at all what
happens. Reliability depends not only on design, but also on quality
control during manufacture, parts screening prior to installation,
failure mode analysis, quality of maintenance, user training, environ-
ment, scheduled maintenance, etc.
SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIABILITY PREDICTION METHODS
During the early days of reliability prediction efforts, it was
universally recognized that the reliability of a device was severely
affected by its complexity, giving rise to the admonition to "keep it
simple." Thus, the early substantive efforts concentrated on a meas-
urement of the complexity of a device, for which the active element
group (AEG) became the usable proxy in electronics. This type of
prediction is exemplified in the so-called Bird diagram,* which gives
a failure rate per operating hour as a function of the analog func-
*George T. Bird, ARINC Research Corporation.
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tional complexity [Fig. III-l]. In addition, different relationships
are associated with different environmental operating conditions, the
least severe being storage, whether in depot or on ship, and the most
stressful being the missile flight environment. For the less stress-
ful of these environments, the failure rate was believed to be linear
with complexity (slope = 45 degrees). For the more stressful environ-
ments , the failure rate depended on the complexity to a power greater
than 1 (slope > 45 degrees).
The Bird diagram was satisfactory during the days when electron-
ics equipment consisted of vacuum tube circuits. Since nearly all
vacuum tubes had an electrically heated cathode and other conducting
elements, their failure characteristics in circuits were reasonably
alike. There was a known degradation phenomenon associated with the
heated cathode emitter, which was certain to make itself felt at some
stage in the life of the device. When transistors came into wide use
in electronics, the usefulness of the Bird diagram declined, since
transistors did not have the same mechanism of degradation associated
with the heated filament in a vacuum tube. Furthermore, the Bird
diagram implied that no significant improvement in reliability could
be made through time, without a decrease in the complexity of the dev-
ice. During the 1960s, it was clear that improvements in the relia-
bility of certain high-quality equipment were taking it out of the
realm of the Bird diagram prediction.
At this stage, it became necessary to account not only for the
vacuum tube, which had been the dominant contributor to unreliability
of the active element group in the tube-type equipment, but rather to
account for all the piece parts in a given electronic circuit. Moving
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in this direction, the most capable researchers in this field
developed failure rates for individual piece parts; these rates were
to be tabulated during the design phase of a device and then added up
to provide an estimate of the failure rate of the assembly. One focus
of this activity was at the Air Force's Rome Air Development Center,
which developed the first handbook for estimating electronic reliabil-
ity. This publication, MIL Handbook 217, was published in the early
1960s. It tabulated hundreds, if not thousands, of failure rates for
individual piece parts, and had a few reliability failure models for
different types of equipment.
The first version of the handbook was followed by two others in
1965 and in 1974. The latter, MIL Handbook 217B [77], contained much
larger tabulations of part failure rates, including derating parame-
ters, environmental stress parameters, and a larger number of relia-
bility failure models. Included in the tabulation were the first
results for modern electronic devices such as monolithic circuits, and
bipolar digital devices, bipolar and MOS linear devices.
MIL Handbook 217B has had two updates. The first added microwave
transistors, high-power tubes, lasers, and cooling blowers and fans to
the original tabulations. The second update, originally scheduled to
be completed late in 1977, will add opto-electronic semiconductors,
including light emitting diodes (LEDs), displays of LEDs, and optical
isolators. It will also include further information on high-power
microwave tubes and some new information on failure models for new
hybrid integrated circuits.
It should be noted that the second update involves devices which
are already in wide use, both in military and commercial systems.
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This means that MIL Handbook 217B can be considered to be at least 1
and probably 2 years behind the technology of these devices and their
wide application. Inevitably, any reliability prediction methodology
based on failure rates of individual piece parts must lag the technol-
ogy it covers, at least until considerable experience has been gained
with the type of circuitry in question. Therefore, one shortcoming of
any reliability prediction methodology must be expected to be the lag
behind current technology.
Mil Handbook 217B contrasts in another way with the Bird diagram.
The earlier method was directly usable in the conceptual phase of sys-
tem design, since so little detail was required to apply it. The more
recent method requires detail design knowledge in order to account for
all piece parts. Thus, one useful facet of a prediction method was
lost in the transition.
The most recent significant development in the field of elec-
tronic reliability prediction concerns computer-aided evaluations of
reliability. Some years ago, Kenneth Blemel, formerly of R/M Systems
in Albuquerque, New Mexico, developed a computer reliability predic-
tion technique for the U.S. Air Force. This method is currently being
used by the Air Force's Logistics Command to estimate spare parts
demand during electronic system lifetimes. The method is primarily
aimed at logistics considerations, and has limited usefulness for
direct reliability predictions [62].
Another computer prediction model was built by Gaertner Associ-
ates for the U.S. Army [81]. Although not directly usable for elec-
tronics reliability prediction outside of military specification
parts, this method was adopted by Rome Air Development Center as the
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foundation for a prediction model to be used by Air Force electronics
development sources. Once again, the method uses military standard
parts nomenclature in evaluating likely reliabilities.
The most recent effort in this field, which has a much better
chance of being used in the commercial environment, occurred at the
Naval Weapons Center, Ridgecrest, California, in collaboration with
Systems Consultants Incorporated, also of Ridgecrest. This Navy-
sponsored development uses commercial descriptions of piece parts for
input parameters to an evaluation model. The model, called 217B
Predict, uses roughly the methodology of the 217B handbook, without
requiring the MIL standard designation of parts [75]. In addition,
the characteristics of standard commercial parts can be input by the
user so that a complete reliability prediction can be made without
requiring a relationship to published 217B reliability figures.
The objective of these computer evaluation models has clearly
been to reduce the amount of effort and time required to- evaluate the
likely reliability of a given electronic design. It is probable, how-
ever, that this effort will have some additional benefits, involving
the elimination of errors of omission or commission which are very
frequent in this type of evaluation. The computer is unlikely to
overlook individual elements in a circuit, or to fail to require the
input of certain environmental parameters. Computer evaluation should
improve the inclusiveness of reliability predictions, if not other
aspects of their quality.
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THE ACCURACY OF RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS
A key element in an understanding of the state of art of relia-
bility prediction methods today is the fact that such methods yield
very poor prediction precision. A review of how good such predictions
have been over the past 25 years will set the stage for the subsequent
discussion of current analysis methods. This review will, of neces-
sity, draw almost entirely on military experience.
About halfway through that 25 year interval, researchers from
Rome Air Development Center reported on the quality of reliability
predictions made during the first 10 years of their intensive
activity. Table III-l shows a comparison of gross field MTBF measure-
ments with predictions for several ground electronic equipments [82].
Table III-l
GROSS FIELD MTBF MEASUREMENTS (NORMALIZED TO PREDICTED VALUE)
Predicted
MTBF
(Mrs)
320
850
490
580
835
513
4131
179
65.2
Equipment
Computer
I/O Controller
Memory Element
Message Processor
Drum Controller
Radar (1)
Radar (2)
Data Display Console
Status Display Console
425-L Display Console
473-L Display Console
Field
Point
Estimate
1.09
2.31
1.35
2.11
1.33
1.27
1.80
0.097
0.25
0.88
1.03
90% Confidence
Interval
Lower Upper
Limit Limit
.99 1.21
1.64 3.35
1.21 1.51
1.61 2.80
1.12 1.60
1.12 1.45
1.54 2.15
0.094 0.099
0.23 0.27
0.79 0.99
(Not Available)
The agreement between prediction and field results is relatively
good in this comparison. However, one would have to read the original
report carefully to note that the equipment being tested "in the
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field" was in air conditioned laboratory environments. Furthermore,
numerous corrections to observed data had been made to eliminate cer-
tain failures which were deemed not appropriate to count against the
inherent equipment reliability. The table shows that experience data
reflects, with reasonable faithfulness, the predictions made for the
equipment in question. Unfortunately, this tabulation of achieved
reliability relative to predicted reliability is not at all typical of
most prediction experience, particularly for airborne equipment.
Indeed, a report by RADC researchers 1 year later showed that achieved
reliability of a larger sample of equipments ranged downward to one-
fifth of predictions [63].
Needless to say, some care is essential to the evaluation of such
data. One can infer directly from the Bird diagram that from a relia-
bility point of view the laboratory is most benign, with other
ground-based environments somewhat more hazardous, and airborne vehi-
cles still more stressful. Thus, evaluation in a laboratory, while
probably necessary at one stage of development, must not be inter-
preted as representative of end use. By the same token, testing and
maintenance by the manufacturer's skilled technicians may not ade-
quately represent treatment by owners or fixed base operator (FBO)
maintenance mechanics. What counts is reliability in the hands of the
user, warts and all.
In line with that notion, a more representative tabulation of
achieved versus predicted reliabilities was the subject of a response
from the Comptroller General of the United States to an inquiry from
the United States Senate a few years ago.* The following table shows a
*The letter, from Elmer B. Staats to Senator Gravel, was printed
in the Congressional Record for December 9, 1974, pp. S20775-S20776.
This letter has been widely used and misused, as in the Reactor Safety
Study, Wash-1400 (NUREG-75/014), Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Appen-
dix XI, pp. 3-15 to 3-21.
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comparison of aircraft radar subsystem reliabilities achieved in
operation compared with their specified MTBFs which were the result of
reliability predictions. Typically, the achieved reliability was
one-fourth to one-third of that specified. In one case, the achieved
reliability was less than 1 percent of the specified MTBF.
Aircraft
F-4B
A-6A
F-4C
F-lll A/E
F-4D
A- 7 A/B
A- 7 D/E
F-4E
F-111D
F-4J
Specified
MTBF*
10
75
10
140
10
90
250
18
193
20
Achieved
MTBF*
4
8
9
35
10
30
12
10
less than 1
5
^'Approximate figures.
worth noting:
One paragraph from the Comptroller's letter is particularly
NASA experts believed that "absolute" reliability
numbers are misleading and that the time required to
develop them is better spent on critical-component
reliability analyses. [NASA] does make predictions
during development to compare design alternatives and
to evaluate components.
A somewhat more recent examination of the quality of the relia-
bility estimates was done by Hughes Aircraft Company for the Rome Air
Development Center. That report, titled "Operational Influences on
Reliability," found, for example, that the field reliability of a par-
ticular piece of avionic equipment depends heavily on the type of air-
craft in which it is used [64]. A more pertinent observation for our
purposes is that field reliability is significantly less than
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contractor-predicted values. In this connection, the contractor-
predicted reliability of the equipment surveyed, when compared with
the reassessed relevant failure rate, showed a ratio of nearly three
to one. The researchers concluded that contractor estimates exhibited
"some degree of optimism." Also noted was the fact that equipment
used on long-duration flights showed significantly higher reliability,
in terms of MTBF, than similar equipment used on short flights, a
phenomenon which we will examine again somewhat later.
Perhaps the most significant finding of the Hughes study is that
field reliability ranges from one-third to one-eighth of the predicted
reliability for the equipment studied, depending mainly on how one
defines a failure. The Hughes study found that of the failures which
were deemed to be "relevant," 45 percent were due to operational fac-
tors and 55 percent to environmental and other factors. These, in
turn, were outweighed by deficiencies that were attributed to defini-
tional factors, which constituted about four times as many "failures"
as those remaining when the so-called non-relevant ones had been
removed.
Attempts have been made to develop methods for estimating relia-
bility in the preliminary design phase, when good information is not
yet available concerning exactly how many piece parts will actually be
used and other features of the design that involve such things as
derating, redundancy, etc. A study of such a method was done by
Hughes Aircraft Company in 1974 for Rome Air Development Center.*
"Hughes Aircraft Company, "Study of Reliability Prediction Tech-
niques for Conceptual Phases of Development," DDC No. A001919.
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Hughes proposed models for both parts count and failure rate or relia-
bility according to a regression study of the data from a number of
avionics systems. The reader should note the strong similarity to CER
procedures and results. For the failure rate of communications avion-
ics equipment, Hughes proposed the following equation:
Ln(F) = 879.816 - .4436DY + .0029476TL + .04224RL
+ .1364PP - .0004324RBP(RBW) - .0002051TL(PP)
where F is the failure rate per million hours, DY is the design year,
TL is the transmitter level in watts, RL is the receiver level in dB
below 1 mW, PP is the prime power in kilowatts, RBP is the receiver
band pass and RBW is the receiver bandwidth. The fallacy of this
equation is that it implies an annual growth of 56 percent in the
reliability of the device, something which we know from experience
simply does not happen. A similar examination was made for the equa-
tion proposed for parts count, and this was also found to have a
tremendous annual improvement factor, which is not reflected in
current technology of avionics. The similarity between this modeling
failure and CER shortcomings described in a previous section are real
and significant.
Where do reliability predictions go wrong? Deterioration from
otherwise justifiable predictions of reliability of electronic equip-
ment can occur in two general areas: the first area is in the factory
environment where the manufacturer of the equipment has control of it;
the so-called, in-house region. The second place where reliability
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deterioration can occur is in the field or in customer use. A brief
discussion of this type of reliability deterioration will be given in
a later subsection.
The manufacturer's responsibility is further broken down into
»
design, manufacturing or vendor control, and workmanship topics. The
effect of design on reliability has been studied intensively. Each
avionics manufacturer typically has his own set of rules which his
designers must follow in designing avionics equipment, such as rules
for derating, parts utilization, design review, etc. Great care is
also required in the manufacturing environment, as for example, in the
control of vendor parts which are assembled into an equipment. Mass
screening techniques have been developed along with burn-in pro-
cedures, testing procedures, etc., all aimed at catching existing or
incipient defects before a piece part is assembled into an end item.
However, another area demands attention: the workmanship of assemblers
in the factory. Once again, each manufacturer has his own set of
rules to be followed by the assembly personnel in the factory: rules
for handling, soldering, testing, etc.
One factor degrading the inherent reliability of a device is
deficiencies in the design of that device. Permissible tolerances,
derating of components, and redundancy in signal paths all can have an
effect on the end reliability of the device.
The importance of design inadequacies in failure to meet relia-
bility expectations is usually underestimated and sometimes overlooked
altogether. An intuitively appealing explanation is that a designer
will find it impossible to believe that his creation will behave in a
manner other than the one he had intended.* In spite of these high
*See Squires, Frank H., "Safety Engineering and the Murphy Ef-
fect," Quality, April 1978, p. 57.
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expectations, many failures are traced to design defects. A fairly
recent example involves about seven million passenger cars recalled
during 1973 for potential safety defects. In more than 200 different
recall programs, the largest single cause was improper design, not
random failure. When all inherent causes were summed, design inade-
quacies of various types accounted for nearly half of all the recalls
[65,66]. This phenomenon is by no means limited to low technology
applications. Many years ago, it was found that a large fraction of
the test failures (actually, malfunctions) in the Atlas missile pro-
gram did not involve real failures of any kind, but were inherent in
the design of the missile or its support equipment [67].
During the process of manufacture, other factors enter the equa-
tion. TSO* specifications are not a guarantee of end reliability.
All they require is that certain specified procedures be followed dur-
ing the design and manufacturing process. The component quality level
also has a demonstrable effect on end reliability. Commercial part
reliabilities are not as good as the reliabilities of "controlled"
parts, which are seldom used in general aviation avionics. The last
step in the factory process involves inspection of the product before
it is shipped, a topic we will treat in some detail.
One of the more important contributors to an increase of relia-
bility of given equipment over the years is the manufacturer's inspec-
tion procedures within his own plant. As an example of how such pro-
grams work, consider the quality control program for preshipment pur-
*TSO (Technical Standards Order). These requirements are aimed
primarily at performance and accuracy objectives.
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poses conducted by one avionics manufacturer. The old production test
program, applied to all units before shipment, consists of 48 hours of
operation at 70 degrees Centigrade, following which a test is per-
formed on the unit at ambient temperature. Under these circumstances,
30 percent of the units fail, and are recycled for repair. In order
to improve the quality of goods shipped, the manufacturer is testing a
variety of modified final inspections. The first of them substitutes
a test at 70 degrees Centigrade for the current test at ambient tem-
perature following the 48-hour run. Under these circumstances, it is
found that 45 percent of the units instead of 30 percent will fail
this test and therefore get recycled. A second candidate of this
nature is to test at -46 degrees Centigrade. Results are not yet
available for this modification.
An even more dramatic change in final inspection procedures
involves a sampling program in which some units to be shipped are
operated for 248 hours at ambient temperature in a pre-burn-in
environment. This operation is then followed by a burn-in process
involving both thermal cycling and vibration for a period of 248 addi-
tional hours. In this type of operation, it has been found that 30
percent of all the failures experienced in the 248 hours of cycling
are experienced in the first cycle of the process. This means that
the first thermal cycle has a better ability to ferret out failures in
the units than do subsequent cycles."'
*For some additional examples of this phenomenon, see William W.
Provett, Jr., and Richard S. Ullroan, "Effective Reliability Planning
and Implementation," Proceedings, 1976 Annual Reliability and Maintai-
nability Symposium, IEEE Cat. No. 76 CHO-1044-7RQC.
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The units tested by all four of these procedures are being fol-
lowed in the field for a period of 1 year to determine which of the
four methods is the most cost effective in achieving a desired
improvement in field reliability of these units.
A number of factors are now believed to contribute to the typical
overestimation of reliability which characterizes reliability predic-
tion. One of the strongest contributors is the pressure to win a con-
tract. Obviously, a high reliability estimate tends to indicate that
a particular piece of equipment may be superior to other candidates
for a particular application.* Another contributor is known to be
non-electronic portions of otherwise electronic systems. The relia-
bility of mechanical systems is usually significantly lower than that
of modern electronics, and considerable efforts are underway to sub-
stitute electronic for mechanical components of avionics systems.
Another factor is believed to be the fact that state-of-the-art tech-
o
nology, that is, technology which is at the forefront of research, is
typically used to gain a sales advantage, even in the commercial
avionics market. Still another factor is the uncontrollable environ-
ment which may be encountered in aircraft. Operating temperatures may
not meet the standard of 40 degrees Centigrade which is typical of the
specified operating environment for a fair number of avionics systems.
Of somewhat lesser importance is the fact that a particular electron-
'•'•"The previously referenced Comptroller's letter to Senator Gravel
quotes an unidentified Air Force Source thus: "...where a manufacturer
is interested in having his equipment look good he can, and will,
select some of the more optimistic data he can find or generate, to
use in his reliability predictions. Thus reliability predictions, for
several reasons, tend to be generally optimistic by a factor of two to
six, but sometimes for substantially greater factors."
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ics manufacturer may have no prior experience in building the type of
equipment which is to be designed for a particular application.
Finally, a number of manufacturers apparently enter the design and
manufacturing stages with no reliability plan, a procedure which is
virtually guaranteed to cause consternation later [68].
Given that the first demonstration of the reliability of an elec-
tronic device is likely to be disappointing, what can be done about
it? The two favored approaches are to make appropriate design changes
to enhance reliability, and to eliminate early or incipient failures
due either to design or manufacturing-caused weaknesses. While other
approaches are also used, these two procedures seem to show the most
progress in the improvement of reliability through the early life of a
system. A General Electric study of several years ago showed an
interesting relationship between the achieved level of reliability and
the effort expended in the improvement and design of manufacturing
techniques for a fair variety of both electronic and mechanical dev-
ices :
a
Cumulative MTBF = kh ,
where h is the total operating hour experience, k is indicative of the
initial (first hour) MTBF, and a is a growth descriptive parameter
less than 1.
Examination of a number of studies which used this so-called
Duane model sheds some light on how quickly reliability can be
expected to grow in a development program. The following table shows
the exponents of the Duane growth model as a function of the reliabil-
ity effort for three studies, the first by General Electric [69] (the
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original Duane study) in 1970, Hughes Aircraft [70] (for RADC) in
1975, and studies by the B-l system program office (SPO) in 1976.
Table III-2
GROWTH RATE DATA
Source Reliability Effort
Low Medium High
General Electric (1970) 0.1 -- 0.6
Hughes Aircraft (1975) 0.3 0.37 0.45
B-l SPO (1976-1977) 0.1 0.3 0.5
Each of these sources shows that the slope (i.e., the exponent a) of
the reliability growth curve can be expected to be low when reliabil-
ity effort expended is also low, and high when reliability effort is
intensive. Typical values for low reliability growth are an exponent
of .1, while for a high growth the exponent is between .45 and .6.
In-house measures, which are applicable to both original design
and reliability improvement efforts, are known to have an impact on
reliability. For example, RCA Avionics has 20 rules to be observed in
the design and manufacture of their avionics products. One category
of these consists of design rules, such as a requirement for minimum
derating in the use of particular types of parts. Another group is
concerned with design practices, such as the use of metal film instead
of carbon resistors in the design. A third category is concerned with
design review; that is, consultation with engineers who are not
involved with the particular design to take advantage of their
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knowledge and experience. Finally, design proof is used in the form
of a testing program to verify that certain design features are indeed
as good as they are hoped to be.
An example of a particular avionics system developed for the U.S.
Air Force (a horizontal situation display, involving complex elec-
tronic and mechanical functions) is illustrative of a number of the
problems and procedures associated with reliability prediction and
reliability improvement efforts. The candidate system for which ini-
tial requirements were specified in 1966 had an original MTBF require-
ment of 580 flying hours. In 1970, this requirement was revised down-
ward by nearly 50 percent, to 300 flying hours, when the first bread-
board systems were available. Needless to say, this was a complicated
system, requiring considerable design effort and ingenuity. The first
prototypes, tested during 1969 and 1970, actually exceeded the
required 300 hours MTBF, giving an average of 360 hours MTBF. How-
ever, when production items became available in 1971, the earliest
test results showed that only 7 hours MTBF was being achieved. A
large product improvement effort was begun; it was projected to
achieve an average of 50 hours MTBF during its accomplishment and to
result in 125 hours MTBF at its conclusion. While the final results
for this system are not available because of security restrictions, it
could be shown, through the use of the Duane model, that the reliabil-
ity improvement programmed into the effort was of a very high order,
requiring considerable effort and expense.
One of the less ambiguous things about avionics reliability is
that it is growing. Figure III-2 is an example of the type of evi-
dence available for commercial aviation equipment. There also seems
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Fig. 111-2 — Reliability trend —727 flight control system
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to be an understanding among the reliability oriented professionals
that when an acceptable level has been reached or surpassed, effort
will be turned in the direction of gaining increased performance, even
at the cost of a portion of the achieved reliability.
A seemingly opposite extreme is exemplified by the Air Force,
which has some reliability growth, but mostly at a much lower level of
1 to 2 percent per year. To be sure, the Air Force occasionally makes
significant breakthroughs in reliability improvement. The reliability
of a redesigned TACAN unit for a new Air Force aircraft increased by a
factor of approximately 10 to 1 over the old unit, even while costs
were decreasing significantly. However, this doesn't always happen.
The reliability of a redesigned UHF receiver-transmitter procured by
the Air Force in fairly recent years actually decreased while the pro-
ject cost increased, although the redesign involved only a translation
from vacuum tube technology to solid-state technology. Part of the
Air Force's problem (not shared significantly by general aviation) is
that their equipment is becoming progressively more complex, heavy,
and expensive. A Grumman study showed that MTBF per thousand parts in
Air Force avionics equipment actually increased by 10 to 15 percent
per year from 1960 to 1970 (remarkably similar to the commercial
equipment), but that this improvement was almost completely offset by
equally dramatic increases in complexity (and thus cost) during the
same time period [71], resulting in the apparent low growth cited.
For a variety of reasons, we believe that Air Force reliability
data are relevant to the general aviation avionics reliability pic-
ture, and not just from a reliability growth point of view. For one
thing, the Air Force operates in a less than optimal environment as
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far as temperatures, weather, etc., are concerned. The Air Force also
has low usage hours, typically 1 hour a day or less for most of the
aircraft in the inventory. This is far closer to the general aviation
situation than is the commercial airline experience of 10 or 12 hours
a day. The Air Force, as just mentioned, experiences slow reliability
progress, probably more akin to general aviation than commercial
experience would be. The Air Force also has a considerable variabil-
ity in the available maintenance skills and practices, due to a rapid
turnover in the work force. Finally, the Air Force is deeply involved
in work with digital multiplexed (integrated) avionics systems like
DAIS, the F-15, the F-16, the former B-l, and the E-3A. These activi-
ties must eventually generate experience useful in general aviation
integrated systems.
The general aviation community seems to fall between these two
apparent extremes of rapid growth in commercial aviation and slow
growth in the Air Force. The relatively few references we have been
able to find indicate that the reliability of general aviation avion-
ics is still growing, but at a somewhat slower pace than for commer-
cial aviation avionics. In the case of general aviation, the growth
seems to be between 5 and 10 percent per year for the same or similar
equipments [72,73,55,56], compared with the apparent 25 percent or
more exemplified in Fig. III-2.
One possible significance of this observation is that the consu-
mer is becoming progressively better informed regarding his own self-
interest in the achieved reliability of specific devices, and he is
willing to forego increased reliability only if additional valued
functions are substituted for the improved reliability which would
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otherwise be expected. The practical impact of this observation is
that the consumer will seldom accept a system, however impressive its
performance, if he believes it to be unsupportable from a reliability
and maintainability point of view.
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS .
This discussion is concerned with what we know about current
avionics reliability. Reliability is an elusive characteristic in
avionics. It's hard to quantify, for a variety of reasons. The peo-
ple whom we would expect to be the best informed, the manufacturers of
avionics, tend in the main to have poor feedback from the field. The
big users of avionics seem to be the best source of information con-
cerning its reliability, and the character of those users seriously
affects such data. Another problem concerns the fact that the usual
criterion for reliability, the mean time between failure, is an inap-
propriate measure for many aviation purposes.
Any assessment of reliability must logically proceed from experi-
ence data. Compared with the amount of such data needed to develop a
predictive model by conventional methods, data applicable to the
owner-pilot portion of general aviation is essentially nonexistent.
To be sure, attempts have been made to develop experience data, most
notably by AOPA and AEA, but all such efforts have fallen short of
even the most minimal requirements for reliability projection. One of
very few successful efforts on our part to get such information came
in a decidedly unconventional form, which does seem to have some prom-
ise, and will be discussed immediately before the Conclusions and
Recommendations subsection.
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Most people, when asked where the best reliability information
might be in avionics, will suggest the manufacturer of the equipment.
But warranty failure data are notoriously unreliable. The manufac-
turer has relatively poor feedback from field users. For example, a
number of unfranchised (usually untried, one-of-a-kind) installations
of this equipment are made in the field, and their results are seldom
reported to the manufacturer. Another source of confusion is the fact
that original equipment manufacturers (OEM's) of aircraft will fre-
quently exchange avionics units at the factory when they are being
installed and will return them to the manufacturer as field failures
instead of factory failures or vice versa. The manufacturer will not
usually know how long one of his units sat on the shelf until it was
either sold by a fixed base operator (FBO) or installed by an OEM. In
any warranty summary, heavy users of equipment will be over-
represented, and this is important because their maintenance tends to
be better than that available to the individual aircraft owner.
Finally, a major contributor to the poor quality of warranty informa-
tion is the fact that the number of hours that the equipment is
operated is unknown. The manufacturer customarily assumes that the
equipment is used 200 hours per year in general aviation. All of
these factors conspire to make warranty data very poor for the purpose
of determining inherent avionics reliability.
Even if one could get good information about field failures and
field operating hours, the extraction of mean time between failures
from these data might still be inappropriate for some purposes. For
example, an emergency locator transmitter (ELT), similar to the one
proposed in the STI avionics suite, shows a purported MTBF of 4500
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hours according to warranty data.* Meanwhile, it is commonly believed
that the reliability of these emergency locator transmitters approxi-
mates only 0.5, a figure based on accident statistics. The low relia-
bility in service is caused not by a short MTBF, but rather by
inherent design inadequacies: the fact that a crash is either not
serious enough to set off the g sensor, or is so severe that the unit
is destroyed, and therefore cannot transmit. Neither of these
phenomena come into play in the calculation of MTBF from warranty
data, nor from any other source.
The mean time between failure may also be an inappropriate meas-
ure when considering flight safety. It has been observed that most
failures occur (or at least are discovered) at the turn-on of an elec-
tronic device. Once operating, an electronic device is much more
likely to work during an entire flight than an MTBF specification
would indicate. This means that an MTBF correctly translated to the
reliability of any particular length of flight will give a much too
pessimistic prediction of the likelihood of failure, particularly for
items with a relatively low MTBF.
An even more fundamental problem with reliability assessment of
avionics is that the inherent reliability is seldom achieved, cus-
tomarily being degraded by a variety of factors.
The end use of an item is probably the biggest contributor to
variability in achieved reliability. The environment in which the
device is used has a substantial effect on the achieved reliability.
*The most common failure mode is a weak battery. Since the dev-
ice is normally push-button tested prior to flight, this mode of
failure is probably not relevant to reliability in use.
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It is well known that higher operating temperatures result in lower
reliability. Another factor contributing to the observed reliability
is the amount of use. Heavy users, as mentioned earlier, get more
hours between failures from comparable equipment than those who use it
a few hours a month. The length of a flight has an unexpected effect
on reliability. Longer flights result in higher observed MTBF, other
things being equal. This is verification of the phenomenon usually
called cycling stress, or turn-on stress, which has been demonstrated
in electronics equipment for more than 25 years. Quality of mainte-
nance is also a contributor to or a detractor from reliability. A
demonstration of this will be given later. Finally, other factors are
known to have an effect on observed reliability in the field, and some
of these will be brought out in the later discussion.
All avionics manufacturers seem to agree that the quality of
maintenance in the field environment has a significant effect on the
observed reliability of their equipment. As an example of this
phenomenon, consider the information in the following table showing
removals and failures, with resultant MTBF calculations, for a VKF
receiver-transmitter in a cargo airline operation. This receiver-
transmitter, which is widely used in commercial and even in general
t
aviation, had shown a fairly steady reliability in this application
over a period somewhat longer than 1 year. During October, November,
and December of 1976, however, a significant decrease in the observed
number of verified failures was noticed. At the same time, the number
of removals seemed normal. Apparent MTBF jumped by a factor of at
least two. This was followed by a period of 3 months in the beginning
of 1977 when removals approximately doubled and failures were verified
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ih nearly all of those removal cases. MTBF dropped to half its normal
level.
PRIOR 14 MONTHS
JULY 1976
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN 1977
FEB
MAR
REMOVALS
188
11
9
21
14
16
21
40
22
16
FAILURES
149
11
5
13
3
7
8
34
22
9
MTBF
1250
1591
3142
742
What had happened, and was vaguely known by the people involved,
was that there was heavy pressure during October, November, and
December of 1976 to get aircraft back into the air when failures had
occurred. This resulted in poor maintenance of these communications
transceivers, with the result that they later failed again. But even
more information is available on this particular situation, which
attracted considerable attention at the organization involved. The
number of removals per aircraft was tabulated for the first quarter of
1977. The expected value was 2.4375. Seven or more removals were
observed in four aircraft, which is far above the expectation for this
number of removals. This is an indicator that something might be
wrong on those particular aircraft.
The same type of analysis can be applied to the individual radio
chassis. An expectation of 0.84 removal during the 3 months was the
appropriate measure. Four or more removals of a particular radio
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would be expected to occur on only one radio during the time period,
but five such radios were observed, suggesting that individual serial
number radios also had a problem.
An even further examination of this particular field problem
involves the individual failure modes. The tabulation below shows
that two adjustment jobs constitute a significant percentage of all of
the problems encountered in these sets during the first quarter of
1977. The other principal contributor, a transistor, is now known to
be the result of a deficient specification in the original manufac-
ture; a campaign is now being conducted in the field to replace all of
these transistors. The last two entries in the table are probably not
epidemic problems.
REPAIRS INDICATING PREVALENT FAILURE MODES
ADJUST AUDIO 9
REPLACE Q208 9
ADJUST SIDETONE 8
REPLACE Q604 4
REPLACE Q410 3
Total 33 = 50 percent of
all repairs
Another of the clear-cut issues in this instance is the effect of
ancillary equipment on total system reliability. Many reliability
analyses do not include the ancillary equipment on the basis that it
is presumed to be an unimportant factor. However, experience with
current avionics equipment indicates that this is simply not the
case.* For example, during the first quarter of 1977, the cargo car-
'"It was not the case more than 10 years ago, as already shown in
Table III-l.
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rier mentioned previously had the following experience with the com-
munications subsystem of their aircraft:
MAINTENANCE EXPERIENCE: (FIRST QUARTER 1977)
QPA» ITEM REMOVALS PERCENT MTBF
3 HEADSETS 60 28%
2 AUDIO PANEL 53 24% (600 HRS)
3 RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER 78 36%
2 MICROPHONES 25 12%
-QUANTITY PER AIRCRAFT
In the table above, failure information for the voice recorder
was omitted, since it is not an essential part of the system. Note
that the audio panels accounted for 24 percent of the removals during
the 3-month time period. Their MTBF was approximately 600 hours, the
lowest MTBF of any item in the assembly, even during a time when the
receiver-transmitters were an epidemic problem. Note also that head-
sets and microphones — clearly ancillary equipment--made significant
contributions to removal rates during the same time period.
In summary, then, general aviation avionics reliability does not
seem to differ much from the reliability characteristics derived for
other classes of electronic equipment, nor for that matter from avion-
ics reliability in military systems.
Given that reliability estimates based on actual records from
general aviation avionics usage are hard to come by, one can reason-
ably ask what other tools might be brought to bear. One obvious
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answer is the previously described reliability prediction work, par-
ticularly MIL Handbook 217B. In that specific case, some precautions
should be observed. We know, for example, that MIL Handbook 217B has
a bias toward a higher reliability than is usually justified in
estimating. Also, commercial parts are normally used in general avia-
tion avionics equipment, rather than MIL spec parts as customarily
assumed in a 217B analysis. Furthermore, the 217B approach assumes a
relatively benign environment in general, even though an allowance is
made for being airborne in a manned environment as an example.
Finally, less than optimal installations frequently occur in the gen-
eral aviation avionics business, and these are known to have a ten-
dency to reduce inherent reliability [72]. If the above factors are
not considered in a reliability analysis, the outcome will indicate an
unreasonably optimistic reliability prediction.
If a system design is predominantly the assembly and interconnec-
tion of sub-units that are in an initial production phase or in a
mature design and usage stage, then estimation of reliability of the
final system offers far fewer challenges, at least for an initial
evaluation. Under these circumstances, field reliability estimates
for individual components are entirely appropriate, though somewhat
difficult to obtain. Assuming that such estimates can be obtained
somehow, there are still some limitations which should be considered
as applicable to the reliability figures thus derived. The assumption
is inherent in most field reliability estimates that the highest qual-
ity of maintenance will be available, and this frequently is not the
case. Another assumption will be that no untested installations will
be represented, and this also is seldom true in general aviation
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equipment. Long flights are likely to make disproportionate contribu-
tions to the reliability data bank available to anyone looking for
such information, and these are not typical of general aviation avion-
ics. Likewise, heavy use will be a characteristic of those data
sources which will constitute the bulk of the information. Always, an
allowance must be made for interface problems, which are highly likely
to be a significant factor, and may even dominate the reliability pic-
ture for such an avionics assembly. Finally, to be fair, we should
note that flight reliability should be better than the customary MTBF
calculations show, because of the turn-on stress mentioned earlier.
One rather novel approach has been developed for estimating
avionics reliability, with at least some degree of success. Many
researchers had previously found that support costs derived from
maintenance activities can be approximated for a fair variety of
equipment as a few percent of original equipment cost per year [45].
This can be translated into a method for estimating the reliability of
prototype or early production systems, and all such methods seem to
have flowed from a study done at The Rand Corporation 25 years ago
[78]. As an example, an ARPA study done a few years ago noted that
for nearly fifty Air Force avionics units comprising communication,
navigation, and computer functions, a fair approximation of field
reliability was provided by the single measure of unit cost, in a sim-
ple inverse relationship:
6
1.3 x 10
MTBF =
DOLLAR COST
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Obviously, very cheap or very expensive equipments may deviate consid-
erably from this relation. The study also examined techniques by
which certain special equipments had mean times between failure one to
two orders of magnitude (i.e., 10 to 100 times) higher than more
representative units [74].
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we have tried to illustrate that both the pred-
iction of the reliability of future systems and assessment of the
reliability of existing systems pose significant problems for the
unwary.
Reliability predictions tend to be severely biased toward the
high side, mainly by various factors associated with competition, but
also by typically novel aspects in new designs: new and untried cir-
cuits, new parts instead of standard, etc. All of these make the
prediction of future numerical reliability extremely hazardous. How-
ever, the prospects for a more limited objective in this area—the
comparison of two (or more) candidate designs for their inherent rela-
tive reliability—are really quite favorable, given only few easily
understood precautions. First, use of the standard MIL Handbook 217B
methodology ensures that many factors known to affect reliability are
assessed equally between or among candidates. The use of a newly
available digital computer program for this purpose increases the
assurance of completeness and lack of bias (both essential to produc-
ing the best of what may still be flawed predictions), and at the same
time reduces the effort and expense required to provide this vital
comparative measure.
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The specific procedures consist of:
1. Listing the individual electronic parts of the system;
this means that a detail design must exist.
2. Associating all relevant parameters with each part,
such as operating conditions, quality level, etc.
3. Identifying special characteristics of parts (number of
gates in an 1C, voltage rating of capacitors, etc.).
4. Applying the above information to tables in MIL
handbook 217B.
This detailed procedure does not mean that these most modern
evaluation methods cannot be misused to provide extravagant reliabil-
ity estimates. They can, by the relatively simple expedient of minim-
izing initial design complexity to the point where the later addition
of circuits and components will become necessary in order to meet per-
formance requirements. Even higher reliability estimates may be had
through optimistic parts selection and derating policies. It should
be clear that such unrealistic assumptions are less likely to be
accepted now, given today's standardized estimating tools.*
A second appropriate course of action should be a continuing sur-
veillance of the current state of avionics reliability in general avi-
ation. The assessment of current avionics reliability is made diffi-
*A related problem arises with regard to comparing systems in
different stages of development, as for example the SIU and STI/MILCO
PCAAS proposals, the former a prelimnary design and the latter mainly
an assembly of off-the-shelf units.
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cult primarily by the substantial number of factors known to affect
it, and the lack of representative data on GAA usage, the latter being
caused by the understandable reticence of those holding even imperfect
information on the subject to share it with the world. This situation
is relieved somewhat by the growing existence of experience data banks
on reliability among users of equipmment as opposed to manufacturers,
but because these users tend to be large, they represent the more
favorable side of environment, installation, and maintenance, and even
of length of flight and intensity (hours/day) of use.
A third appropriate reaction is to watch for relevant experience
with other integrated (multiplexed) systems, particularly commercial
and Air Force avionics. Expanded activities in these areas should
make more reliability information available on that subject.
Needless to say, sufficient problems remain to cause even profes-
sional reliability engineers to have a conservative view of what can
be accomplished. Two of the more outstanding areas in which informa-
tion is inadequate are those relating to interface problems, which
have yielded only somewhat to accepted standards in (for example) mul-
tiplex systems, and software reliability, which becomes a questionable
area in virtually every new system.*
If any one recommendation is worth making about this subject, it
is to beware of false prophets, who have been around since reliability
emerged as a discipline. There are no panaceas, and only a relatively
*The second edition of the well known "Reliability: Management,
Methods and Mathematics" by David Lloyd and Myron Lipow has a long
chapter devoted to this subject [79].
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limited (though increasing) number of viable tools that, when used
with appropriate care, can often deliver enlightening results.
Finally, we have observed that quality of maintenance has
demonstrably beneficial effects on reliability as reflected in mean
times between failures. Some implications of this fact are explored
in the next section.
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IV. MAINTAINABILITY OF ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
The subject of maintainability for general aviation avionics
equipment has been of deep concern to manufacturers, service shops,
and professional organizations (for example, the Aviation Electronics
Association (AEA)) for many years. Through the efforts of these
organizations maintainability of general aviation avionics equipment
has been improving, but avionics maintenance is still a significant
part of the cost of ownership.
In promoting the development of highly integrated avionics sys-
tems for general aviation aircraft, the problem of maintainability is
understandably of deep concern to NASA. This concern stems partly
from the known problems and costs of maintaining contemporary equip-
ment, and partly from the fact that in the few instances in which com-
ponents have been interconnected in an architecture similar to that
shown in Fig. I, the problems of fault isolation have been found to be
very different from those encountered in more conventional systems.
The capability of incorporating a range of self-test programs in these
systems is appealing, in the expectation that it could greatly sim-
plify fault isolation. However, a significant incorporation of these
features in an operating system is yet to be completely successful.
The initial objective of the maintainability part of this study
was to develop a generalized methodology that would allow the predic-
tion of maintenance costs (man-hours/flight hours) as a function of
design/performance parameters. The development of this methodology
depended on the availability of field experience data on avionics from
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the general aviation community, and our ability to identify the per-
tinent design/performance parameters.
During the course of the study, we attempted to locate data and
identify design/functional parameters through interviews throughout
the avionics industry. We found that field data on maintenance are
equally as scarce as cost and reliability data. Although some FBO's
keep records on maintenance action, the cost of assembling these data
is prohibitive. It was also difficult to ascertain if there were
enough data in the records to permit reasonable statistical analysis.
Although the study was unable to produce generalized methodolo-
gies, the interviews with the many organizations and individuals pro-
duced considerable information that can be useful to anyone designing
avionics equipment for maintainability, and for NASA to judge the
maintainability of a proposed design.
In this section, we have assembled the results of our industry
interviews. We have tried to identify and, to the extent possible,
analyze the many factors that might be useful in evaluating or design-
ing an advanced avionics system. In trying to piece together the
parameters affecting the cost of ownership, one is quickly made aware
that maintainability is a complicated concept involving such varied
factors as quality of service people, service organizations, equipment
design, documentation, usage environment, test equipment, and test
procedures.
In discussing maintenance with a number of users, it is clear
that they have more than a passing concern about avionics maintenance.
On the average, it has been estimated that the maintenance bill for
contemporary solid-state general aviation avionics equipment runs
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about 3.5 percent of the original cost per year [45]. This does not,
however, represent the total cost picture, as the user experiences it.
In many cases it requires 2 or 3 days to troubleshoot and repair a
complicated unit, and the aircraft is usually unavailable for use dur-
ing this period. Consequently, the knowledgeable purchaser of a new
avionics suite is not only looking for advanced capability, but also,
as a concomitant goal, for the reduction of the maintenance costs and
the mean time to repair (MTTR).
Most of the documented experience in designing for maintainabil-
ity is either from the military or the commercial airlines. While
much can be learned from looking at this experience, it should be
recognized at the outset that the maintenance structure for supporting
the general aviation user is very different from that of either the
military or the airlines. In addition to organizational differences,
the skill levels of the people, the complexity of the equipment, and
the economics are also different. In an airline operation, economics
dictate that a quick return of the aircraft to service is the number
one objective, even at considerably higher maintenance cost. This
requirement for a short MTTR also exists for military aircraft in time
of crisis operations or combat; consequently, the military maintenance
philosophy must also be geared to this type of operation.
AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
In the Air Force operation, the user seemingly has substantial
control over his destiny. Maintainability requirements can be written
into procurement contracts to ensure that newly acquired equipment can
be supported. Also, the avionics maintenance personnel are under the
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direct control of the user. The training level of the people is set
by the user, and if additional training is believed to be needed, it
is provided at the user's expense. The user also controls who repairs
what, and where repairs will be made. Inventories of line replacement
units (LRUs) are maintained at the expense of the user, so that an
aircraft can quickly be returned to service with simple replacement of
failed units. Malfunctioning units that have been removed from ser-
vice are then repaired in the shop and returned to inventory. In the
case of the Air Force, different levels of shop maintenance are
authorized for different organizational entities, e.g., minor repairs
(printed circuit board replacement, etc.) are performed at the base
shop, and units requiring major repairs are shipped to a depot. In
either event, each LRU is repaired by someone who has specialized on
that particular unit. Both the Air Force and the airlines have con-
cluded that today's avionics are so complex, and have such a multipli-
city of functions, that it is not reasonable to provide in-depth
training in each system for all line and shop personnel.
In spite of having complete control over its maintenance operat-
ing equipment, philosophy, and personnel, the Air Force is still hav-
ing serious problems in maintaining the highly integrated advanced
avionics systems that have entered the inventory since 1968. This has
caused much concern, and considerable effort is being expended on
understanding this problem.
A 1974 Rand study [8] took a broad comprehensive look at the Air
Force problem in developing and maintaining these highly integrated
systems. Some of the observations and conclusions of this study may
provide insight into approaches to designing for maintainability in
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integrated avionics systems for general aviation. A few of the more
important ones are presented here.
The following conclusions were held hy the 1974 Rand study team
members at the beginning of the study, and formed the basic premises
for their research:
1. In the development of a new component, there cannot be
complete a priori knowledge of that component's failure
modes.
2. In the integration of known components into new arrays, new
failure modes are introduced which cannot be completely
predicted.
3. The only way we know of thus far to identify these failure
modes prior to operational deployment, and to provide
reliable verified diagnostic procedures for subsequent
field identification, is by long and expensive test programs.
4. To perform technical improvements repeatedly in a new
weapons acquisition program is expensive, time-consuming,
and operationally imprudent.
It was found that the interaction of the units of a highly
integrated system sometimes produced results that were unexpected.
For example, the report stated the following:
Modern avionics systems are integrated through a digital
computer; or, as in the FB-111, a group of digital
computers receive information from the various items of
equipment, process it, and provide corrections back to the
various pieces of equipment plus output indications to the
crew. Through the corrections provided to individual
pieces of equipment, interactions occur between the pieces.
An output from one item of equipment in an integrated
system reflects not only its own performance but also that
of others. Moreover, a malfunction in one item of equip-
ment may be detected more clearly in the output from
another. Such a coupling effect from one piece of equipment
to another is a new phenomenon in avionics, and is one
characteristic of highly integrated systems.
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It was observed that the performance of an integrated system w;is
determined by how closely the equations that constitute the mathemati-
cal model of the system represented the real world and the desired
performance. Any failure in the model produced a faulty operation,
the same as a malfunctioning piece of hardware would cause faulty
operation. Much of the problem experienced by the Air Force in util-
izing integrated systems was identified as the failure of the model to
accurately describe the functional requirement and the real world in
all operational situations.
Another serious problem identified by the Rand study was inade-
quate fault-isolation capability. This aspect of the problem was
characterized in the following way:
The nature of. fault isolation has changed under the impact
of integrated, complex avionics systems and highly automated
test equipment for inflight diagnosis, shop repair, and
depot repair. No longer does a pilot describe a malfunc-
tioning piece of equipment to ground personnel, who proceed
to trouble-shoot the equipment. Instead the functioning of
a built-in test equipment light signals a malfunction to
the ground crew, who remove the indicated item of equipment
and take it to the avionics maintenance shop. There the
equipment is subjected to a complete standard test on
automated test equipment. If it fails the test, the indi-
cated plug-in modules are replaced and the test is repeated.
If the equipment cannot be repaired, it is returned to the
depot where automatic test equipment is used in a similar
fashion by more experienced people.
This growth of automatic test equipment at all echelons of
repair standardizes the testing and reduces the training
required to trouble-shoot the equipment; however, as the
above description illustrates, it almost completely cuts
off communication between the levels of maintenance and it
places total reliance on the fault-isolation capability of
the automatic test equipment.
Unfortunately, the fault-isolation capability of built-in
tests and shop test equipment has not been adequately
tested. Current procedures only show that the test equip-
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raent will pass good units and will fail completely faulty
units. Since the actual distribution of failure modes is
not known when the test equipment, its associated computer
programs, and its operating procedures are developed, it
is not surprising that the effectiveness of the test equip-
ment in fault-isolating field failure modes is completely
untested.
In spite of this uncertainty, the capability of the built-
in test equipment and shop aerospace ground equipment to
isolate faults is taken for granted in the maintenance
philosophy and in spare provisioning. This, and the lack
of communication between levels, leads to frequent dis-
agreement between test results at different levels of
maintenance. A fault indication will appear on a flight,
but subsequent shop test shows no fault with the equipment.
Components are removed in a shop test as faulty, but in
depot testing they show no fault. In the absence of
special tests, these results appear only in the aggregate
results of higher-level testing, since the lack of communi-
cation between levels obscures results in specific cases.
The pertinent point is that deficiencies in fault-isolation
underlie a large part of avionics problems. To correct
these deficiencies will require improved validation of the
capability. In practice, extensive testing of the equip-
ment and computer programming affecting fault-isolation is
extremely lengthy and expensive. A possible compromise
is to reduce the scope of the problem through the use of
already developed and tested building-block equipment
components. With these, the principal failure modes and
symptoms should be well understood before the equipment
is used in a particular system. Testing of fault-isolation
can concentrate on the limited set of new failure modes
induced by the particular application or environment of
the new system. Divide and conquer, so to speak.
The maintenance problem of integrated avionics systems in the Air
Force has been further complicated by the inability to retain mainte-
nance personnel. Data collected in a T976 Rand study [6] indicated
that in 1975, the probabiity that a person who initially entered the
avionics flight-line maintenance career field would remain in the Air
Force to his fifth year of service was 14 percent.
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AIRLINE EXPERIENCE
The air carriers do not face the same complexity level as the Air
Force. Their requirement is to get from point A to point B safely in
all kinds of weather. Military avionics, on the other hand, has the
additional complication of sophisticated weapons systems. The air-
lines also maintain a more conservative approach to avionics systems.
This conservative posture is exemplified in a number of ARINC stan-
dards; for example, the recent standard for DITS (MARK 33 Digital
Information Transfer System). The standard excludes multiplexed use
of transfer buses, allowing only one information source on each bus.
All of this is not to say the airlines do not have complex maintenance
problems—only less so than those faced by the Air Force.
One requirement in airline maintenance is fast turnaround time.
The average time between arrival and departure is 1/2 hour for through
flights, and 1 hour for turnaround. During a recent seminar on air-
line avionics maintenance [5], one airline official summed up the
problem as follows:
In the amount of time listed, we and notably the
manufacturers expect a line mechanic to look in an
aircraft log book, analyze a hurriedly written set
of symptoms about a system or systems that transcend
three or more ATA chapters in the maintenance manual,
may involve 50 or more LRUs, and make the right
decisions with at least 85 percent probability of
success!! With the present troubleshooting aids, or
lack of aids, they do well to achieve their present
success rate.
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The principal maintenance aids currently used by line technicians
to isolate problems are fault balls," BITE (Built In Test Equipment),
inline monitors, and ground test equipment. The following evaluation
of the quality and utility of these different diagnostic aids was
presented by Mr. Jim Takeuchi of United Airlines at the Avionics
Maintenance Conference:
Fault Balls
The airlines are strongly of the opinion that fault
in most of today's so equipped LRUs are ineffective
and even misleading. Specifically, they are classified as
"oversensitive" and "unreliable." A very few LRUs are
referred to as having reliable and effective fault ball
operation. A survey conducted some time ago at United
illustrates the point: of 940 aggregate fault balls on 24
LRUs installed in wide-bodied aircraft, 408 were tripped,
eight of which with related write-ups and 400 without any
write-up in the log book.**
Built In Test Equipment (BITE)
The airlines are almost unanimous that BITE as it
exists today is inadequate. It is expensive. It is
insufficiently reliable within itself, and has a very low
confidence level. Some airlines seriously question the cost
effectiveness of BITE. Some time ago an engineer at United
made a study of the 727 A/P BITE reliability and came up
with the following interesting observations:
a. Following a gripe, if a unit self tests good, is
the system good? - 53 percent yes.
b. Following a gripe, if a unit self tests bad, is it
bad? - 60 percent yes.
*Fault balls are electromechanical indicators used to indicate
the occurrence of an event. They can be triggered by a voltage level
or a pulse, and once triggered, they remain triggered until they are
reset mechanically.
**Airline responses to a questionnaire indicated that the concept
of fault balls itself was not in question. It is the circuit that
should be refined to be practical.
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c. Following a gripe, if a unit is replaced straight off,
without self test, is the plane fixed? - 63 percent
yes.
Historically, BITE or self test was given up as
something extra or a nice thing to have. It seldom
came as a result of a solid maintenance management
plan. It needs a systematic approach. Any self test,
for which we pay plenty, must be considered as an
integral part of the basic system design, not as an
added on feature. ...We the airlines, need on board
line maintenance aids and testing methods that are at
least 85 percent effective in localizing a defective
LRU, transducer relay, etc. This is a must for multi
box systems.
In-Line Monitor
As the purpose of the in-line monitor is to inform
flight crews of failure(s) detected in flight, and not
necessarily to be used as a primary line maintenance tool,
it provides little help for the line mechanic. Nevertheless,
the in-flight monitor has been a source of many unconfirmed
removals. An important point is that the monitor threshold
levels must carefully be determined to minimize unnecessary
removals. It is one thing to establish design tolerances;
it is quite another to see that these tolerances closely
relate to the level at which pilots begin to recognize
performance degradation.
Line-Test Equipment
Eighty percent of the airlines feel that today test
boxes are so complex or inconvenient that they cannot
practically be used except on layovers, and that simple
inexpensive function no/go go test boxes would help isolate
quickly to the LRU level.
The airlines are in total agreement that improvements must be
made in fault-isolation methods. The current shotgun approach to mak-
ing rapid repairs (replace everything that could possibly cause the
problem) is too costly. The capital cost of purchasing enough addi-
tional spares is tremendous, and the shop costs to constantly test and
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return these spares to stock further increase the cost. In addition,
the wear and tear on plugs, connectors, and LRUs under constant remo-
val and reinstallation ultimately cause further problems. The number
of nonconfirmed removals (NCRs) now runs as high as 50 or 60 percent,
and promises to become worse with the addition of more complicated
equipment, unless better methods of fault isolation are developed.
Unfortunately, if an airplane must be back in the air in a half hour
or so, the shotgun approach is currently the only effective solution.
If repeated squawks followed by a maintenance action are required to
ultimately find a_ single failure in an LRU, then it becomes clear that
reliability moves down on the importance scale, and maintainability
becomes the dominant issue.
In summary, airline experience in avionics maintenance shows the
number one issue to be fault isolation in the aircraft system.
Present methods are woefully inadequate. The next level of importance
is one of LRU maintainability. The 1977 ARINC Avionics Maintenance
Seminar [5] identified, and discussed in detail, a number of areas
that need improvement: piece parts, printed circuit boards, connec-
tors, thermal design, component accessibility, testing methods, etc.,
and, finally, the need for better documentation. Unfortunately, docu-
mentation has not kept up with the sophistication of the new equip-
ment. A maintainability questionnaire, consistin of 24 detailed ques-
tions, was answered by 40 different airlines, a summary of which is
included in the Proceedings of the ARINC Maintenance Seminar. Since
many of the issues are equally relevant to general aviation avionics,
the summary of this airline response to the maintainability question-
naire should be referenced by anyone designing advanced general avia-
tion avionics equipment.
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GENERAL AVIATION
There is very little documented experience on maintainability of
general aviation avionics, and even if there were, it is doubtful that
it would give useful insights into the problem of maintenance in
highly integrated systems. The best source of information is the mil-
itary and airline experience previously discussed; however, the
differences in the requirements and the organization must be kept in
mind at all times.
The general aviation user has no standard procedure for maintain-
ing equipment. Most users rely on the independent avionics repair
shop for service; however, some larger FBOs do maintain and control
their own independent facilities and personnel.
All shops performing service on installation must be certified by
the FAA. The rules governing the shop operation and certification are
set down in Civil Aeronautics Manual 52. CAM 52 requires that a shop
have (a) appropriate service and instruction manuals issued by the
manufacturer, and (b) minimal prescribed electronic test equipmment.
Also, the individual in charge of inspection, maintenance, and
overhaul must have had 18 months experience in the work he is
supervising. The FAA currently divides avionics equipment into three
classes: communications equipmment, navigation equipment, and radar
equipment. A shop must have certified personnel and equipment for
each class of equipment that it will install or service.
On the surface, these minimal safeguards seem enough; but in
practice, they afford very little help to the user of the service. It
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is very difficult for a general aviation user to make an a priori
evaluation of a particular independent shop, or of the individual
capabilities within a shop. One shop may be capitalized at $30,000,
which probably represents the bare minimum of equipment and material,
whereas another shop may have $200,000 or $300,000 in sophisticated
test equipment. Also, the FAA requires only that the individual in
charge be certified; the qualification of the remaining service people
is the responsibility of the management. A requirement of 18 months
of practical experience for a supervisor is very little assurance of
competence. Also, the required management certification of competence
adds very little to the user's confidence level.
Competency in service personnel is one of the most serious prob-
lems faced by the general aviation community. Many of the service
technicians stay with general aviation only long enough to build up
experience; then they move into airline jobs where the pay is higher,
the fringe benefits are better, and the working hours and conditions
are better. There are some good avionics shops throughout the coun-
try, and there are some highly qualified competent people in the busi-
ness, but discussions with a number of FBOs who depend on independent
avionics shops point to the general inadequacy of this service for the
general aviation community.
Another area where general aviation is different is in the con-
cept of an LRU. In an Air Force or airline operation, all replacement
units are owned by the user, and replacing an LRU is simply a matter
of exchanging something the user owns for something else he owns.
This is seldom the case in general aviation. A typical aircraft owner
would be reluctant to accept the exchange of functional black boxes as
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a means of repair unless the units he received were identical and in
as good condition as those he originally bought. Also, the service
shop could not possibly afford to stock serviceable units of all the
myriad different makes and models of equipment he is likely to
encounter. The maximum LRU level of complexity that seems acceptable
to the average owner, and that would be reasonable for most avionics
shops, is the printed circuit (PC) board level. The PC board as a
field replacement unit has gained wide acceptance in repairing home
television sets, computers, computer terminals, and other electronic
equipment.
In designing new systems, it is the responsibility of the
manufacturer to decide on the maintenance philosophy to be followed.
Once that philosophy is established, equipment design and factory sup-
port must conform to that philosophy. For example, if the principal
LRU is to be the printed circuit board, a number of things must be
done. The system design must incorporate pluggable PC modules, the
modules should be accessible without removal of major chassis, and the
modules should conform to system function in such a way that they will
support fault diagnosis. System partitioning into LRUs can be devised
in such a way that it will minimize the time required for fault diag-
nosis (and thus, support costs), provided this aspect of system design
is considered simultaneously with other system requirements and
maintenance planning.
It is highly unlikely that avionics manufacturers can provide, or
influence to any significant degree, the incentives needed to attract
good, high-level people to the general aviation avionic maintenance
career field. Also, any pressures applied by the FAA in the form of
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more rigid certification requirements will only serve to reduce the
number of people who choose avionics maintenance as a career, assuming
that salaries remain the same. This is unfortunate, but it is a fact
of life that must be reckoned with. Another problem is that contem-
porary avionics maintenance personnel are trained and experienced
predominately in analog devices, with little or no knowledge of digi-
tal circuits and systems. Although training and exposure over time
will change this, there is no way to quickly implant many years of
experience into the profession.
The ability of maintenance personnel is an additional factor that
must be considered by the manufacturer in establishing maintenance
philosophy. A reasonable approach is to conduct research and experi-
mentation on job performance aids and training methods to enable the
utilization of persons of lower levels of ability. This approach has
been used by the television service industry and to some extent, the
computer industry, with reasonable success.
Another part of the maintenance philosophy relates to the kind of
support required from the manufacturer. If the intended philosophy is
that PC boards are not normally repaired by the independent avionics
repair shop, then exchange serviceable boards should be available to
the shops within 24 hours or less. Since shipping time is an impor-
tant factor, regional resupply or repair stations may be required.
Regional factory repair stations could provide complete maintenance
service to the user; however, the impact of this competitive posture
with the independent shops should be examined carefully. Advanced
avionics systems that are highly integrated, such as the Demonstration
Advanced Avionics System (DAAS), offer some unique challenges in the
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area of maintainability. There is some military experience, and there
is some experience from other industries; however, the applicability
of this experience to general aviation is not completely clear. For
this reason, the maintenance philosophy and the means for carrying it
out must remain flexible to accommodate what is learned about the real
problems and the effectiveness of the system to deal with them. This
means that information feedback to the manufacturer must be planned
and provided for. One means of keeping the manufacturer in the infor-
mation feedback loop longer is by providing extended warranty services
(beyond 1 year). This would discourage unfranchised installations,
and encourage factory-controlled maintenance. Extended warranty ser-
vice contracts have been used successfully by RCA in television war-
ranties, and by Sears Roebuck & Company in the maintenance of home
appliances.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Air Force and airline experience with advanced avionics
equipment shows fault diagnosis and isolation to be the number one
maintenance problem. One of the problems that frustrates the design
of tests (i.e., diagnostic program development) for detection and
location of faults is that when systems are highly integrated, failure
modes are introduced that are very difficult to predict. For this
reason it is essential to emphasize fault isolation early in the
design stages. To ensure that maintainability is considered early in
the design, a requirement must be placed on the designer to establish
a maintenance philosophy and plan as part of the preliminary design.
An evaluation of the philosophy and plan should be conducted at each
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design review to ascertain if they will work, given the technical
capabilities of existing maintenance personnel and the organizational
structure.
A part of the early design should include a model describing the
equipment performance; however, since real world performance cannot be
predicted precisely, it is important to continue the testing and
updating of this model throughout the design, development, prototype
testing, and early operational phases of the program.
Although the contemporary approach is toward automatic fault
diagnosis, there is still a requirement for some degree of human
interaction in the operation of tests, and in the interpretation of
test results. This human interaction in the fault diagnosis process
must also be tested during the development process.
In testing of human interaction with the fault diagnostics, the
technical capabilities of the individuals involved should be carefully
considered. To utilize design engineers with a deep familiarity with
the intricacies of the system and the automatic test procedures (ATP)
will reveal very little about how a line service technician can use
the ATP for fault isolation. Testing must be representative of the
real world.
The opinion of people who have responsibilities for the mainte-
nance of avionics is that the PC board level is probably the best
level for a line replaceable unit (LRU) in the kind of electronics
that will be used in advanced avionics systems. There are strong
indications from other industries (e.g., television, computer, etc.)
that for much of the electronic equipment, the PC board is a good
modular level to establish as an LRU. It may be that a larger unit
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will have to be removed from the airplane and shop tested, but even
then, the actual replacement part probably should be a PC board. It
must be recognized that these other parts of the avionics structure
that are not PC boards are still contributors to equipment failures.
These components must each be analyzed and provided for in the overall
fault diagnosis procedure and maintenance plan.
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V. SOME SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS
We have chosen to discuss software separately in this study in
order to give it special emphasis; however, this is not to imply that
software should be considered separately. Software and hardware are
closely interrelated components in a system, and are not individual
entities to be developed separately, using different management and
control techniques. The computer and its associated software are but
one element of the system and thus should be treated as a holistic
subsystem during most phases of the design process.
Any of the proposed advanced avionics systems (AAS) will clearly
be increasingly reliant on larger and more sophisticated computer pro-
grams to perform many of the basic functions. These may be automatic
functions, such as the monitoring of aircraft systems, or they may be
operations requested by the pilot. In addition to performing in-
flight operations, computer programs may play an important role in
fault diagnosis and in the maintenance of the avionics system itself.
Because of the safety-critical nature of many of the in-flight opera-
tions, as well as the potential for reducing system maintenance costs
through fault isolation, it is important that avionics system software
reliability and maintainability factors be carefully considered
throughout the entire system development process. This section
discusses some of the problems that have been experienced in develop-
ing software, and some generally accepted guidelines for minimizing
these problems.
Traditionally, software has been viewed as completely reliable
once it becomes operational, simply because its performance does not
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degrade over time or through repeated use. However, experience has
shown [79] that software can perform to an acceptable level most of
the time, even though it contains coding or design errors in seldom-
exercised logic paths. This is especially true of complex systems.
Performance of this kind might be adequate if one were willing to
accept degraded performance or could tolerate occasional errors. But
in applications involving flight safety, the loss of some key function
or faulty operation is intolerable. Experience has also shown that
software flaws may not show up in the testing phase, and a failure may
first appear months or even years after the system is placed in opera-
tion.
Lloyd and Lipow [79] present twenty-four definitions of software
quality characteristics. Two that are critical to AAS software are
included here to clarify the goals of good design.
Reliability: Code possesses the characteristic
reliability to the extent that it can
be expected to perform its intended
functions in a satisfactory.manner.
This implies that the program will
compile, load, and execute, producing
answers of the requisite accuracy; and
that the program will continue to operate
correctly, except for a tolerably small
number of instances, while in operational
use. It also implies that it is complete
and externally consistent.
Maintainability: Code possesses the characteristic
maintainability to the extent that it
facilitates updating to satisfy new
requirements or to correct deficiencies.
This implies that the code is under-
standable, testable, and modifiable,
e.g., comments are used to locate sub-
routine calls and entry points, visual
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search for location of branching
statements and their targets is
facilitated by special formats, or the
program is designed to fit into avail-
able resources (memory) with plenty of
margin to avoid major redesign.
There are differences between software and hardware reliability
and maintainability, and these need to be well understood in assessing
a particular design effort. For example:
1. Software, unlike hardware, does not wear out or
degrade over time or with use. However, software
may "fail" (i.e., not perform according to
specifications) because of a hidden flaw in the
program design or a mistake in coding.
2. New imperfections are not introduced in making
copies of a computer program, but existing errors
are reproduced faithfully.
3. Computer programs are unconstrained by physical
laws and therefore are not susceptible to a priori
proof that design objectives are impractical.
4. There are many more distinct configurations and
paths to check in software than in hardware.
5. Software failure modes are usually different from
hardware failure modes. Software will fail without
warning and may leave no indication that a failure
has occurred, or of the time and source of the
failure.
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Another difference is that people, including those who manage
system development, have a much better intuitive understanding of
hardware than they do of software. Thus, software problems might
sometimes be overlooked until it is too late to take reasonable
corrective action. System managers and developers of software must be
aware of the characteristics of good software design, and how to
achieve them during the different phases of development.
It is clear that the way to produce reliable software is to
remove all errors from the software package prior to placing it in
operation; however, this is extremely difficult to do in actual prac-
tice. It means producing software that has minimal errors in the
first phase, and then testing and debugging it until all remaining
errors are eliminated. In large software systems, several years of
use may be required to find all the mistakes and bugs.
One study [90] showed that over 60 percent of software errors
occur during the requirements formulation, preliminary design, and
detailed program design phases, and that less than 40 percent of them
arise in the programming and coding phase. From this, one can see
that the basic fundamentals of error prevention are simple: a func-
tional structure that represents realistic requirements, and care in
producing the system. It is extremely difficult, however, to state
valid, complete, and unambiguous requirements for a new system.
Therefore, any requirements that are developed must be subjected to
vigorous scrubbing by some adversary process involving experienced
system users to test their validity and completeness. Once a good set
of requirements has been achieved, the design and coding of the system
must proceed with great care. Some generally accepted techniques for
minimizing errors in the design and coding are:
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1. The use of a hierarchical approach (e.g., top-down
structured programming) with parallel refinement of
functional requirements.
2. The use of higher order languages (HOLs) unless assembly
language is necessary to minimize storage and for timing
problems.
3. The use of organizational structures conducive to
effective software production, e.g., "Chief Programmer"
concept [91].
AAS software will require attention throughout the lifetime of
the system for a number of reasons. First, there will be errors to
correct, even after a program reaches the field, and more effective
methods will be developed for performing certain functions. Second,
as the system matures in the field, enhancements and new functions
will be added to meet specific new operational requirements. These
additions will be especially important to commercially produced sys-
tems that must be competitive with improved products from other
manufacturers. For this reason, a plan must be devised early in the
design phase to allow for a software maintenance activity.
To support program changes, software documentation must be main-
tained throughout the life of the system and a strict procedure for
updating it must be established. This procedure should (1) ensure
that corrections made to one copy of the documentation are reflected
in all copies; (2) allow evolution from one system .release to another
to occur without affecting system operations; and (3) ensure that all
changes to a system are thoroughly tested before the system is sent to
•
the field.
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Maintainability is a feature that must be planned for in the sys-
tem design. Some general guidelines that have been found effective
are:
1. Use a modular design approach.
2. Limit the size of each module and limit the
functional responsibility of each module.
3. Use a coding structure that is easily understood.
4. Include complete and consistent comments in the
code.
5. Prepare documentation consistent with internal
code comments.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we have discussed, briefly, some important but
often overlooked factors in the development of systems with a substan-
tial software component. Software problems are frequently traceable
to the early conceptual stage, and often result from poor and unreal-
istic system requirement specifications. Failure to employ accepted
software engineering techniques in producing the system design can
also cause problems. Finally, errors frequently go undetected during
the coding and integration phase because of inadequate testing and
poor documentation.
To prevent these problems, management and designers should assess
the software system and its components throughout the development pro-
cess in terms of the following critical questions:
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1. Have the requirements been scrubbed and subjected
to an adversary process?
2. Have hardware and software tradeoffs been made?
3. Are good software engineering procedures being
included in the design process?
4. Does the design allow for easy modification and
for update of the software?
5,. Does the design facilitate testing, and is there
an integrated test plan?
6. Is documentation and documentation maintenance
being planned for?
It is not only important to ask these questions, but it is neces-
sary that someone be able to accurately interpret the answers. For
this reason, some software development expertise should be available
in all design reviews. Although structured programming and Chief Pro-
grammer organization are recommended, it should be emphasized that
they will not offset the effect of poor programmer motivation and
talent.
-105-
PAGE BtAtJK NOT
Appendix A
ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED DURING STUDY
I. Manufacturers of General Aviation Equipment
o Bendix Avionics, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
o Collins Avionics, Cedar Rapids, Iowa
o RCA Avionics, Van Nuys, California
o King Radio, Olathe, Kansas
o Narco Avionics, Ft. Washington, Pennsylvania
o Delco Avionics, Santa Barbara, California
II. Manufacturers of General Aviation Aircraft
o Cessna Aircraft, Wichita, Kansas
o Beech Aircraft, Wichita, Kansas
III. Users of Avionics Equipment
o Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee
o Krueger Aviation, Santa Monica, California
o IFR Electronics, Van Nuys, California
o United Airlines, San Francisco, California
o ARINC Incorporated, Annapolis, Maryland
o ARINC Research, Annapolis, Maryland
IV. Air Force Agencies
o Rome Air Development Center, Rome, New York
o Air Force Avionics Lab, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
o F-16 Program Office, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
o Advanced Airborne Command Post Office, L.G. Hanscom
Field, Massachusetts
V. Government Contractors
o McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, Missouri
o Dynamics Research Corporation, Wilmington, Massachusetts
o Hughes Aircraft Company, Culver City, California
o Charles Stark Draper Labs, Cambridge, Massachusetts
VI. Commercial Companies
o INTEL Corporation, Sunnyvale, California
o Delco Corporation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
o Hewlett Packard Corporation, Palo Alto, California
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VII. Professional Organizations
o Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA)
o National Business Aircraft Association (NBAA)
o General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA)
o Aircraft Electronics Association (AEA)
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